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Social interactions between men and women are subject to lots of influences, be it during an 
encounter, on the work place, in an intimate relationship, etc. Moreover, whereas they are 
in a similar situation, men and women react quite differently. Benevolent sexism is one of 
the factors that affect men-women relationships.  
In this dissertation, an experiment was built in order to study the impacts of benevolent 
sexism on relationships between men and women in a particular frame: the Ultimatum 
Game. The authors try to know the impacts of benevolent sexism on women’s behaviour 
during an Ultimatum Game, and that according to the context female participants are in. 
Female participants played the role of receivers who had to accept or reject offers proposed 
by photographs of men on the computer screen. 
The results of the experiment revealed that the kind of offer (fair, unfair, very unfair), the 
context (romantic or occupational) and the level of benevolent sexism as well as 
attractiveness of the photographed male’s faces will influence female participants’ 
behaviour and their decision-making process in an Ultimatum Game.  
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Glick and Fiske (1996) developed the notion of Ambivalent Sexism that is a 
combination of positive and negative feelings towards women. This form of sexism is 
composed by a hostile part and a benevolent one. The hostile part is comprised of all the 
negative feelings that men have toward women, like the fact that they are less competent 
than men, less strong, more fragile, etc. Moreover, hostile sexists think that women want to 
control men, through lots of means, like sexuality or feminist ideology, for instance (Glick & 
Fiske, 2000). The benevolent part of Ambivalent Sexism consists of positive feelings that men 
possess about women. They consider them as a fragile human being who needs to be 
protected, physically as well as financially. They also recognise that men depend on women, 
a dependence that can be defined in terms of a reproductive function. However, these 
positive feelings are sexists in the sense that women are seen as inferior to men and that 
they are locked up in restricted roles (Glick & Fiske, 1996) that keep the right order of things, 
namely that men socially dominate women, and that this justifies the social system in place 
(Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
Several studies showed that benevolent sexism (BS), although positive in appearance, may 
have deleterious effects on women. It was demonstrated that benevolent sexism, among 
others, decreases women’s performances (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007; Dumont & 
Dardenne, in preparation) and their impression of competence (Dumont, Dardenne, & 
Sarlet, in press). Benevolent sexism also has an impact on women in the way they are 
evaluated. Women who are engaged in non-traditional actions and who do not respect the 
traditional way of life elicited more hostility to them than women who behave in a 
traditional way (Hebl, Glick, King, Singletary, & Kazama, 2007; Viki & Abrams, 2002). 
Moreover, it is worth noting that not only men are holding benevolent attitudes towards 
women; women also accept benevolent sexism, either as a justification to a restriction 
(Moya, Glick, Exposito Soledad de Lemus, & Hart, 2007), as a reason to blame women who 
violate traditional social norms (Viki & Dominic, 2002), or to define women’s appropriate 




Facial characteristics have been the object of several researches in the field of social 
psychology. It has been demonstrated that the extent to which faces possess a certain level 
of Afrocentric or Eurocentric features may matter a great deal in everyday interactions. For 
instance, facial features may activate associated stereotype (Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 
2002) and these associated stereotypes may have impacts in the legal field and on the 
heaviness of legal punishment (Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004a). Moreover, this activation of 
associated stereotypes that are elicited by facial cues is quite automatic and people are not 
conscious of using it, which makes it difficult to avoid (Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004b). But 
facial cues are not only associated with racial stereotypes, they also play a part in the 
activation of gender stereotypes (Mason, Cloutier, & Macrae, 2006). 
The Ultimatum Game is a sort of economic game in which two players face each 
other. Player 1 (the allocator) has to share a certain amount of money and propose his share 
to player 2 (receiver) who can either accept or reject player 1’s proposal. If player 2 refuses 
the offer made by player 1, neither of them will receive any money. However, if player 2 
accepts the share proposed by player 1, they both receive the amount of money determined 
by the proposal of player 1. Consistent with the economic rational behaviour theory, players 
in an Ultimatum Game should play according to the Nash Equilibrium (also called perfect 
equilibrium), holding that player 2 should normally accept all offers since it is positive 
because he would win money (Güth, 1995). On the contrary, this is not what happens. 
Receivers are ready to let go money that can be won easily in order to punish a too unfair 
share of the pie. What is seen in most of the Ultimatum Game is that players 2 reject offers 
that are a too unfair share of the total amount. Several researchers attempted to explain this 
“abnormal” reaction. Some explained it by the sense of fairness (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, 
& Sefton, 1994; Bethwaite & Tompkinson, 1996; Harrison & McCabe, 1996; Nowak, Page, & 
Sigmund, 1996; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Haselhuhn & Mellers, 2005), others showed that 
physical appearance had an impact (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007), or even the will of punishment 
(Bolton & Zwick, 1995). Gender has also been found as affecting behaviour (Eckel & 
Grossman, 2001; Hadgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008; Solnick, 2001) just 
like age (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998) and physical attractiveness (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). 
The aim of this dissertation is to know whether all these facts could be associated, 
whether there is a link between all these elements. We want to know whether we can start 
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from the fact that facial features can be classified according to the level of BS characteristics 
they possess, as this is the case for the level of Afrocentric characteristics. We also wonder 
whether those BS facial cues could have an impact on the way players behave in an 
Ultimatum Game. Would BS facial cues have an effect on the behaviour players adopt in an 
Ultimatum Game? If there is an impact, would it be different according to the type of offers 
and the context in which players are? Would the rejection/acceptation rates of offers vary 
depending on whether a romantic or an occupational context is activated? Could the fact 
that the proposed offer is fair, unfair or very unfair make a difference? Moreover, would the 
participants’ level of BS matter in the way they behave in an Ultimatum Game? Would it be 
different in a romantic context, compared to an occupational one? 
In our first section, we will present the literature that could be helpful to know what has 
been done in the fields we are interested in. We will begin with a quick review of works in 
the fieldss of stereotyping, racism and sexism. Afterwards, we will introduce Glick and Fiske’s 
theory of Ambivalent Sexism (1996), focusing further on the benevolent part of ambivalent 
sexism and its effects. In a second part, we will review the studies in the field of facial 
perception, including the role of skin tone, the impacts of Afrocentric features and facial 
cues’ works. Finally, the Ultimatum Game and the elements that are important in the 
players’ behaviour will be reported, including, among others, the role of emotions, fairness, 
gender and physical attractiveness. 
In our second section we will present the experiment we conducted in order to try and 
answer these questions, in which an Ultimatum Game was built, composed by 39 pictures of 
men associated with 39 offers, divided in three types of offers (13 fair ones, 13 unfair ones, 
and 13 very unfair ones). Participants were assigned to two conditions, i.e. romantic or 
occupational context. We decided to activate two different contexts in order to test whether 
the context in which participants are, could have an impact on adopted behaviours, as in 
Moya, Glick, Exposito Soledad de Lemus, & Hart (2007). 
The results of this experiment are presented to help us answer our questions, which would 
be expressed according to concrete hypotheses.  









In the perception of others, the process of categorisation comes into play. Categorisation 
helps individuals avoid the sensation of being snowed under all social informations present 
in the environment and with which individuals are confronted. This process allows them to 
classify the world (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1997). According to Padilla (2008), social categorisation 
is useful to accentuate similarities between and within groups. “Any social or physical trait 
that is meaningful to a person and/or group can be the basis for social categorization, and in 
turn, the categorization can serve as the foundation for social identity.”(p.10). Once 
categorisation is done, the social comparison arises. People who are “less” than others (e.g., 
less rich, less intelligent, etc.) are negatively evaluated whereas people who are “more” than 
others are positively evaluated. Once people are categorised, stereotypes and prejudices 
appear.  
Stangor (2000) defines stereotypes as: “beliefs about the characteristics of groups of 
individuals [...]” (p.1).  
The harmonious relationships between people and groups depend, among others, on the 
ability of recognising individuals as unique. Not being able to treat a person as a distinct 
entity is a central point of prejudice and stereotyping (Brigham, 2008).   
There are several kinds of stereotypes:  
– Racial stereotypes  
– Gender stereotypes 
– Age stereotypes 
– Sexual stereotypes (about sexual orientations) 
– Stereotypes about fat, mentally sick, HIV-positive people, etc. 
(See Stangor, 2000, for a review). 
These kinds of stereotypes lead to a certain prejudice, defined by Leyens and Yzerbyt as “un 
sentiment, généralement négatif, à l’endroit de personnes du seul fait qu’elles sont 
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membres d’un groupe donné1 » (p.295). Dion (2003) defined prejudice as “biased and 
usually negative attitudes toward social groups and their members” (p.507) Racial 
stereotypes lead to racism, gender stereotypes to sexism, age stereotypes to ageism, etc.    
In this thesis, we will only speak about racism and sexism because of their interest for our 
purpose. 
1. Racism 
Racism can be defined as “a negatively oriented prejudice toward certain groups seen as 
biologically different and inferior to one’s own” (Dion, 2003, p.507) 
Every minority group in the United States has always been, and still is, a target of racism and 
prejudice. Among those targets are skin colour minorities such as Chinese, Black, and 
Mexican people. 
In the US, race has the power, among others, to determine a certain racial group 
membership, who to marry and where to live, what kind of job one can have, the chances to 
achieve scholar education and to take part in the political process, etc. (Willis-Esquada, 
2008).   
In their chapter, New Directions in Aversive Racism Research: Persistence and Pervasiveness, 
in “Motivational Aspects of Prejudice and Racism”, Dovidio and Gaertner (2008) tell us that, 
according to Kovel (1970, cited by Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008) racism can take two forms: the 
dominative racism, which is the more explicit form of racism and the aversive racism, which 
is more ambivalent. There is a simultaneous cohabitation of sympathy toward groups that 
were victims of injustices in the past and of negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks.  The 
combination of explicit attitudes of equality and negative implicit attitudes is characteristic 
of attitudes manifested in aversive racism. This form of racism is subtler and more indirect 
than dominative racism, whereas its consequences are quite similar to those of dominative 
racism.  
                                                             




Dovidio and Gaertner, still in the same chapter, assert that despite the decrease of overtly 
prejudicial and racist attitudes in the US in the past 40 years, other forms of racism arise. 
Those other forms share a common basic postulate holding that, despite the fact that most 
European Americans consider themselves as non-racist and in favour of race equality, they 
continue to possess, although unconsciously, negative feelings and beliefs toward colour 
minorities. For example, Devine (1989) showed that, when they couldn’t control the use of 
stereotypes, even low-prejudiced individuals used them and are not aware of using them. 
Wittenbrik, Judd and Park (1997) also showed that when people were primed with a black 
prime, an implicit activation of black stereotypes and prejudices appeared.  
Discrimination that emerges from aversive racism is complex and influenced by several 
factors. One of these factors is the nature of the situation. If antidiscrimination social norms 
are strong in a situation, aversive racists would not discriminate people. On the other hand, 
if social norms are weak, they would discriminate but in a way that is congruent with their 
image of being a non prejudiced person (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008).   
To go into more details, see “Motivational Aspects of Prejudice and Racism” (Willis-Esquada, 
2008) for a more complete review of concepts and studies in the domain of racism.            
2. Sexism 
A. Sexism in General 
Sexism can be defined as negative feelings toward women (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1997).  
As for racism, sexism can be expressed in two different forms: old fashioned sexism and 
modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). The former expresses negative 
stereotypes toward women, especially about their aptitudes that are minor compared to 
men’s; it holds a difference in the treatment between men and women as well as adhesion 
to a traditional ideology in which women fill their conventional roles. The modern form of 
sexism is subtler, as for modern (or aversive) racism, building itself on the denial of the 
existence of discrimination toward women. Swim et al. (1995) developed and validated a 
scale of modern sexism. The results of their experiment indicated that a distinction between 
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old-fashioned and modern sexism does exist. This distinction seemed to be more important 
in men than in women. 
Other sexist scales have been developed and validated in the past. One of them was, for 
instance, the Sex-Role Egalitarian Scale (Beere, King, Beere, & King, 1984) which contains 
two parallel 19 items forms. These items represent each of five domains of adult living: 
marital roles, parental roles, employee roles, social-interpersonal-heterosexual roles and 
educational roles.  
Notwithstanding the negative feelings toward them, it has been shown that women are 
evaluated more favourably than men. Eagly, Mladinic and Otto (1991) found in their results 
that no negativity toward women was expressed at the emotional level. In fact, it appeared 
that women were evaluated, by both male and female participants, in a more favourable 
way than men. But maybe this effect is due to the sample used in the experiment: college 
student that are well educated and thus maybe less stereotyped.  
Despite the interest of all the existing sexist scales, we will only go into details concerning 
the ASI scale developed by Glick and Fiske.  
B.  The Theory of Glick and Fiske 
In 1996, Glick and Fiske introduced the notion of ambivalent sexism. They asserted that 
sexism, rather than being a relatively uniform antipathy toward women, is marked by a 
profound ambivalence.  “Ambivalence can occur between elements of the same component 
of an attitude, such as when people possess both positive and negative feelings about a 
minority group (intracomponent ambivalence), or between two components of an attitude, 
such as when people possess negative beliefs but positive feelings about junk food 
(intercomponent ambivalence).” (Olson & Maio, 2003, p.310) 
Sexism has for a long time been considered as hostility toward women, ignoring positive 
emotions that men can feel toward them, that go on an equal level with sexist antipathy. 
Glick and Fiske (1996) then perceive sexism as a construct made of two components: a 
hostile part (hostility toward women) and a benevolent part (containing the more “positive” 
aspects of sexism). They define the benevolent sexism (BS) “as a set of interrelated attitudes 
14 
 
toward women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted 
roles but that are subjectively positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver) and also tend to 
elicit behaviours typically categorized as prosocial (e.g., helping) or intimacy-seeking (e.g., 
self-disclosure)”(Glick & Fiske, 1996, p.491). However, BS is not considered as a good thing 
because, in spite of its apparent positivity, it is linked with the traditional role ideology (in 
which the male is dominant) and has deleterious effects on women, as we will see later on.   
Moreover, benevolent sexism is not felt as being sexism by the individuals it is addressed to.  
Despite the fact that benevolent sexism suggests a subjectively positive view of the female 
part of the population, it has common points with hostile sexism (HS): the idea that the 
female sex is the weaker one and that women need to be taken care of by men. Hostile 
sexism considers women as incapable of taking care of themselves financially and 
benevolent sexism offers a possibility to confine women to their household role. Men 
experience simultaneously a desire of dominance over women and a need of intimate 
relationship with them, for reproductive purposes.  This blend of two opposite feelings does 
well express the “benevolent” and “sexist” aspects of benevolent sexism. 
To sum up, the two parts of sexism “revolve around issues of social power, gender identity 
and sexuality” (Glick & Fiske, 1996, p.493). Glick and Fiske also proposed to split benevolent 
and hostile sexism in three shared subparts: Paternalism, Gender Differentiation and 
Heterosexuality. 
 
Paternalism is a mix of dominance (dominative paternalism) and affection and protection 
(protective paternalism). On the one hand, women are seen as non-competent human 
beings, thus a form of masculine authority is required.  On the other hand, men are 
dependent on women (because of the reproduction of species), which pushes them to 
protect, cherish and take care of women, because of their relative weakness and fragility. 
 
The Gender Differentiation accentuates the necessary differentiation between sexes (men 
are stronger than women) to legitimise the power of men over women (competitive gender 
differentiation). Yet, because of the reproductive dependence of men on women, women 
are seen as possessing positive traits that complete men (complementary gender 
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differentiation). For the benevolent sexists, “the woman completes the man” (Glick & Fiske, 
1996, p.493).  
 
Heterosexuality is one of the most important sources of ambivalent feelings of men toward 
women.  The dependence of men on women generates an atypical situation in which 
members of a dominant group are dependent on members of a dominated group. Men 
desire women sexually and their motivations are either linked to a true wish of closeness 
with women (heterosexual intimacy) or to a need of dominating them (heterosexual 
hostility).  
The term of “ambivalence” is used because the authors deemed that the two components of 
sexism (BS and HS) generate opposite feelings toward the women’s group. Although these 
two constructs are linked, their emotional consequences are contrary, which confirms the 
ambivalence of this kind of position. Moreover, this ambivalence is made possible thanks to 
the categorisation of women in two subgroups: women who fulfil their traditional roles, a 
mother who cooks and takes care of the children, and non-traditional women who violate 
the traditional ideology (e.g., feminists), who are then disliked by men. On the one hand, this 
category allows men to think about themselves as non-prejudiced toward the women’s 
group in general because only some women breed their hostility. On the other hand, women 
who fulfil their conventional roles on one dimension but not in the other trigger ambivalence 
in men.  
Glick and Fiske developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), which is a 22-item scale 
composed of two 11-item subscales (HS and BS). They validated it in several studies (Glick & 
Fiske, 1996; Glick & Fiske, 1997). They found that the presence of hostile sexism and 
benevolent sexism were repetitively confirmed and reliably measured by the ASI scale. They 
tested several models – a one-factor (sexism) model, a simple two-factors (without BS 
subfactors) model and a full model (BS and HS, with three BS subfactors) – and kept the one 
holding that sexism is made up of two components: hostile sexism and benevolent sexism, 
which is divided in three subcomponents: Protective Paternalism (PP), Complementary 
Gender Differentiation (CGD) and Heterosexual Intimacy (HI). This full model is the one 
which best explains the reality. They compared the ASI with other sexist scales and found 
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that though HS components measure concepts that are evaluated by other existing scales, 
BS components measure an aspect of sexism that most of the other scales did not take into 
account. Discriminant, convergent and predictive validity of the ASI was also confirmed by 
the studies.  
The ambivalence of men towards women is a reality that exists across countries. Glick et al. 
(2000) demonstrated that, across 19 countries, HS and BS are positively correlated 
constructs, are predictors for respectively negative and positive traits to women, and predict 
inequality of gender. Moreover, it was revealed that women tended to reject HS more than 
BS when sexism was higher in their country.   
We can ask the question: if men are ambivalent toward women, is the reverse also true? Are 
women ambivalent toward men? Glick and Fiske (1999) examined the reactions of women 
toward men. They developed the Ambivalent toward Men Inventory (AMI). As with 
ambivalence toward women, the authors created a scale, composed of two components, 
hostility toward men (HM) and benevolence toward men (BM), each of which was composed 
of three subcomponents: resentment of paternalism (resentment towards men’s power and 
dominance), compensatory gender differentiation (women’s positive differentiation from 
men) and heterosexual hostility (resentment of male sexual aggressiveness) for the HM 
scale, and maternalism (positive attitudes toward men), complementary gender 
differentiation (respect for the power of the dominant group) and heterosexual attraction 
(affection between men and women) for the BM scale. This scale has been validated. Though 
being very interesting, the concept of ambivalence toward men and its related scale will not 
be discussed any further. 
 
a.  Effects of Benevolent Sexism 
Research shows that BS can have deleterious effects on women, especially on women’s 
performances.  
Dardenne, Dumont and Bollier (2007) explored the insidious effects of BS. The aim of this 
study is to discern the impact of BS and HS on women’s performances. Four experiments 
were conducted to analyse this impact. In the first study, the tested hypothesis was that BS 
would not be perceived as sexism, contrary to HS, which would be perceived as sexism by 
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women. Besides, they hypothesised that BS would be perceived as disagreeable and, since it 
would not be possible to attribute it to something external, women would feel doubts and a 
decrease in performances would appear. Female participants were confronted to a hostile, 
benevolent or neutral description of an opportunity for a job made by a recruiter. Then they 
had to perform a test composed of 9 problems they had to solve. The results emphasised an 
effect of the type of sexism on women’s performance. The effects were more deleterious in 
the BS situation, confirming the hypothesis. Moreover, as predicted, BS was not perceived as 
sexism, in contrast with HS. The second experiment tested the hypothesis that BS would be 
perceived as equally unpleasant as HS, although it would not be perceived as sexism. BS 
would also have negative effects on women’s performances. The procedure was the same 
than in the first study except that the instructions were not read but played by accomplices. 
The participants were asked whether the context was felt as pleasant, and to what extent. 
The results showed that the two forms of sexism (BS and HS) were perceived as significantly 
less pleasant than the non-sexist condition. The results of the first experiment were 
replicated, namely the expression of BS from the recruiter had a negative impact on 
women’s performances at the test. The third experiment was aimed at testing two kinds of 
BS conditions in order to make sure that weak performance is due to BS and not to other 
variables. Participants had to read instructions, given by the recruiter, which expressed 
either BS with help, BS without help or no sexism. The results showed that in both BS 
conditions women’s performances at the test were weaker than the performances in the no 
sexism condition. The performances in the two BS conditions did not differ significantly from 
one another. The fourth experiment was conducted to examine the effect of intrusive 
thoughts that are triggered by BS as well as the impact of gender identification on women’s 
reaction to sexism. The experiment revealed that women who were highly identified to their 
group performed better than those who were lowly identified. Moreover, a greater number 
of intrusive thought had been reported in the BS than in the HS condition. The intrusive 
thoughts played a role of mediator between the manipulation of sexism and performance as 
well as the number of items attempted. Overall, these four experiments supported the fact 
that BS, more than HS, has negative impacts on the women’s performances. This effect can 
be thwarted by the identification to a group. We saw that the more a woman is identified 
with her group, the better she performs at a test. This effect of identification is one of the 
means to foil the negative effects of BS on women’s performances.  
18 
 
Another means is presented in Dumont and Dardenne (in preparation) who conducted a 
study that aimed at examining the moderator effect of the difficulty of associating negative 
feelings to sexism as well as implicit activation of the so-called women’s incompetence on BS 
influence on women’s performances. The first experiment showed that giving a positive 
feedback to women about their performance allowed them to feel confident in their 
performance and especially allowed to keep the performance’s level intact even when 
confronting BS. A positive feedback resulted in a better performance. The second 
experiment demonstrated that the introduction of hostility in a BS context permitted 
women to associate negative feelings they feel to this hostility, resulting then in a non 
decrease in performance. The possibility of attributing unpleasant feelings elicited in a BS 
situation to the hostile source resulted in a cancellation of noxious effects of BS on 
performance. Other researchers were interested in different means of combating the 
deleterious effects of BS on performance but we will not speak about this in this section 
because it is of no interest for our thesis. 
Dumont, Sarlet and Dardenne (in press) realised a study in which the impact of BS on 
women’s autobiographical memory and self-construal were examined. As in Dardenne et al. 
(2007) participants were confronted with a situation of recruitment for a job. Participants 
were divided into three conditions: HS, BS and no sexism, which were expressed by 
complementary comments of the job description. Then, the participants accomplished a 
Reading Span Test (in which they had to read sentences, to tell whether they were 
grammatically correct and to remember the last word of each sentence). After the test, they 
were to fill in questionnaires about the thoughts they had during the test. At last, pretending 
that they were in an independent second study on the autobiographical memory, they were 
asked to report as many situations in which they felt “silly, incompetent, a less smart than 
others” (Dumont, Sarlet & Dardenne, in preparation) as possible. The results showed that in 
the BS condition, women had greater facilities to remember moments when they felt 
incompetent than in the HS and neutral conditions. In addition, they were confronted with 
more intrusive thoughts associated to the fact of being incompetent in the BS condition than 




Overall, all these researches presented here demonstrate that BS can have a negative impact 
on women, especially on women’s performances. Even though BS is not always perceived 
and recognised as sexism by women, its impact is real and is worth being studied.     
 
b.  When Women Hold BS Beliefs 
Despite the negative impact of BS in women, a question emerges: do women accept BS? If 
the answer is yes, in which condition would the acceptation of BS appear? Some studies 
bring an answer to these questions.  
For instance, Glick and Fiske (1996) found, among other results described above, that 
women can hold benevolent beliefs. After that, other researchers took an interest in the 
benevolent beliefs that women can possess.  
Killanski and Rudman (1998) wanted to know if women would accept men’s BS while 
disapproving of HS. Those women are called equivocal egalitarian. They approve BS and 
disapprove HS in ambivalent sexist men. The hypotheses are then that equivocal egalitarian 
women exist and that those women high in equivocal egalitarianism would not see HS and 
BS as positively correlated, would present a positive personal epistemology and would 
possess traditional personal goals. The female participants had to fill in the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 
1996) and an attitudes scale about reality (The Attitudes about Reality Scale, Unger et al., 
1986, cited in Killanski and Rudman, 1997). After that, they had to read three men’s profiles: 
one BS, one HS and one non-sexist. They had to estimate to what extent they thought the BS 
and HS profiles described the same person. To finish with, they were asked to write their 
long term life goals (in ten years from now). The results showed that the BS and HS profiles 
were not evaluated as describing the same person. In addition, a positive personal 
epistemology was associated with a greater acceptance of BS. Moreover, the results showed 
that women holding more traditional goals did not deem BS and HS profiles as depicting the 
same person. Thus, possessing a positive personal epistemology and having some trouble 
considering the simultaneous presence of BS and HS in one man leads to a greater 
acceptance of BS and to an unfavourable reaction to HS men. Thus women who accept BS 
attitudes but not HS ones exist. Nevertheless, the study showed a preference for non-sexist 
men over BS men. 
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Viki and Abrams (2002) conducted an experiment that examined the role of BS in a case of 
an acquaintance’s rape. They wanted to explore the reactions of men and women, and who 
they would blame for the rape. The participants had to read a text in which an 
acquaintance’s rape was described. In the control condition, no personal information about 
the victim was given. In the “cheating” condition, the victim is presented as married with 
children. They hypothesised that the married woman would be blamed more than the 
woman depicted in the control condition. This effect is predicted to be moderated by BS, 
increasing then the level of blaming when the level of BS is high. The participants had to read 
vignettes describing the behaviour of a woman (control or “married mother of three”) 
during a party, followed by the rape of this woman later that night, after having invited a 
man to her house. After reading the situation, participants were asked to report to what 
extent they thought the depicted woman was responsible of what happened to her (on a 7-
item scale). As predicted, the results revealed that participants blamed the woman who was 
being unfaithful more than the one whose civil status was unknown. The higher the 
participants scored on the BS scale, the more they tended to blame the female rape victim if 
she violated the social norms associated with the expected behaviour of women in general. 
This suggests that BS plays a role in the attributed responsibility to female rape victims if 
they had previously transgressed traditional rules of what is the expected conduct of a 
woman, married and mother of three. 
Sibley, Overall and Duckitt (2007) tested the hypothesis that BS would decrease women’s 
resistance to the more hostile forms of sexism. This would especially appear when women 
are high in BS and high in the RWA scale. “RWA predicts prejudice that is motivated by the 
desire to preserve traditional values and maintain collective security and cohesion.” (p.745). 
Thus, women high in RWA are hostile to women who violate norms prescribed by BS and are 
consequently hostile sexists toward these women. The level of RWA is seen as a moderator 
of BS on HS and not as a direct antecedent of BS. The results showed that women high in 
RWA supported an ideological system which maintains a status quo in the society, namely 
the inequality between men and women. This is called system-justifying effect. These 
women high in RWA punish women who do not respect and who transgress this system of 
values. It is worthwhile to note that this effect appears in the society of New-Zealand, known 
to be one of the most egalitarian societies in the world.  
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Helb, Glick, King, Singletary and Kazama (2007) were interested in examining the reactions 
towards pregnant women (vs. non-pregnant) in conventional (store client) versus non-
conventional (work candidate) roles. The coexistence of benevolent sexist attitudes toward 
pregnant women that submit to traditional roles and hostile sexist attitudes toward those 
who violate these roles suggests the existence of an ideological system which prevents 
pregnant women from entering a professional process that breaks social gender standards. 
Two studies were conducted; the first examined the reactions of store employees towards 
conventional (vs. non conventional) pregnant (vs. non-pregnant) women whereas the 
second one examined reactions of professionally active adults facing fictive pregnant and 
non-pregnant candidates who postulated for a masculine or feminine job. The results 
showed, for the first study, that pregnant women were confronted to more hostility when 
they were job candidates and to more benevolence when they were clients. The second 
study revealed that reactions toward pregnant candidates were more hostile than toward 
non-pregnant candidates and that, for the masculine jobs (and not for the feminine ones). 
Overall, pregnant women who were not in a traditional role were punished by both male 
and female participants.  
 
What can be deduced from these studies is that women who do not conform to traditional 
prescribed roles are not well considered by people. They have to stay in their “place” lest 
being treated in a more hostile manner and attract negative attitudes and considerations 
from others. BS is thus accepted both by women and men and used to keep the right 
balance of things in society. BS is a way of justifying the system that put women and men in 
a power relationship dominated by men. This effect is called system-justification, by Jost and 
Banaji (1994). This refers to “the psychological process whereby prevailing conditions, be 
they social, political, economic, sexual, or legal, are accepted, explained, and justified simply 
because they exist” (p.11). Thus, “people will ascribe to themselves and to others traits 
which are consonant with their social position, whether positive or negative, rather than 
question the order or legitimacy of the system which produced such arrangements or 
outcomes. These tendencies towards system-justification occur even when subjects know 
that the arrangements or outcomes were arrived at arbitrarily and result in negative 
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consequence for them.”(p.11). All this explains why women hold benevolent beliefs and 
punish those who do not.      
 
c. When Women Approve BS 
Two researches demonstrated that women do accept BS in a romantic context.  
Viki, Abrams and Hutchinson (2003) took interest in acceptable and accepted behaviours in 
the field of intimate men-women relationships. They developed a new measure, the 
“paternalistic chivalry”, which is inspired by Glick et al. (2000) who say that men high in BS 
think that a man has to have a woman in his life in order to be happy and complete. 
Furthermore, men think that women have to be protected and it is necessary for men to 
take care of their safety. Attitudes that are part of the paternalistic chivalry appear as an 
exacerbated politeness and behaviours of consideration toward women as well as 
restrictions to women during the courtship. The authors used the term paternalistic chivalry 
in order to accentuate the fact that attitudes are both tinged with courtesy and restrictive. 
They hypothesised that both acceptation of and adhesion to paternalistic chivalry by 
participants would be influenced by BS rather than by HS. The higher the participants’ level 
of BS, the more they would accept and adhere to paternalistic chivalry. Male and female 
participants had to fill in the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and a 16-item scale measuring the 
paternalistic chivalry, created by the authors. A significant relation between BS and 
paternalistic chivalry was found, confirming the hypothesis that the higher the participants’ 
degree of BS, the more they are likely to adhere to paternalistic chivalry. Individuals who are 
high in BS appear to be more favourable to a beliefs system in which women must be 
treated with courtesy and consideration while their role in the courtship is subject to 
restrictions.    
Moya, Glick, Expósito Soledad de Lemus and Hart (2007) analysed women’s reactions to 
protective restrictions. The authors used scenarios in three experiments. In the first study, 
the scenario presented a man who does not want a woman to drive a long journey, justifying 
this by the fact that women are terrible drivers (hostile) or that driving for a long time is 
tiring and stressful for women (protective). The man described was either the woman’s 
husband or a co-worker. The results revealed that only women high in BS accepted a 
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protective restriction, but only from their husband or boyfriend. In the second study, the 
scenario described a realistic but fake situation of an internship proposition centred on the 
counselling of rapists and wife abusers, to social sciences students. The female participants 
then received their boyfriends’ reactions to this proposition. This reaction was either 
associated with a hostile justification, a personalised protective justification or no 
justification at all. Results showed that only female participants high in BS had a positive 
reaction to their boyfriends’ restrictions, with or without justification. Low-BS participants 
treated the no-justification restriction as much more negative than the hostile justification 
restriction. However, when a personalised protective justification is offered, most of the 
participants accept their boyfriends’ restriction. In the third study, male and female law 
students were offered a hypothetic internship which implied interviews of criminals. The 
participants were acquainted with their partner’s refusal about the participation in this 
internship. The justification of the refusal was either absent or a personalised protective 
one. Only the female participants received, in addition, a justification based on the female 
group in general (that the internship is not safe for all women). The results revealed that 
only BS female participants accepted as a justification to a restriction about the participation 
in an internship implying interviewing criminals the fact that it is dangerous for women in 
general. This shows thus that protective paternalism can bring BS women to accept 
restrictions stemming from a romantic partner. 
 
What we can conclude from this is that women accept BS in a romantic context when it 
comes from their romantic partner and when women are breaking the social norms holding 
that women have to submit to traditional roles and possess communal characteristics, as 
being kind, caring, loving, helpful, sweet, a good mother, a good homemaker, etc.         




3.  The Role of the Face in Person Perception 
Some researchers collected various findings stemming from lots of studies done in the past. 
These studies had the impact of facial features during the process of person perception as a 
common theme. These reviews allow us to have a global, but non exhaustive, view of what 
has been done. 
In their paper, Berry and McArthur (1986) review different researches done in the field of 
ecological approach of McArthur and Baron (1983, cited in Berry and McArthur, 1986) which 
hold that “facial characteristics may influence impressions if they typically reveal 
psychological attributes whose detection is important for adaptive functioning”(p.3). The 
researches the authors review in this paper support the prediction that adults with childlike 
facial attributes also have childlike psychological qualities. After presenting some of the 
works in psychology and ethology, they centred their attention on the ecological approach 
of social perception. They point out the impact of age-related craniofacial changes on social 
perception, whether seen in the lens of a single characteristic or in a global view. The 
isolated features that could have an impact are, according to the author, craniofacial profile 
changes, vertical placement (forehead and chin size), facial shape, eye characteristics, skin 
qualities and feature length. For each feature, some of the studies done are presented. For 
example, in the section concerning the changes of the craniofacial profile, the findings of 
three studies realised in the eighties are described. They all showed the impact of the 
changes in the skull’s shape, due to age, in the person perception. Both adults and children 
used these features in their perception of a person in diverse situations. The findings were 
also supported by some other studies. We also learn that the forehead and the size of the 
chin have an importance in social perception. The older we become, the more the chin and 
the forehead are changing. More specifically, the relative size of the chin grows whereas the 
relative size of the forehead diminishes. And these changes have impacts on the perceived 
age of the people. At least five research findings are advanced as evidence of the impact of 
vertical placement of features. In addition, the studies reviewed by Berry and McArthur 
(1986) emphasize the role of the facial cues’ shape on impressions. Without going into 
details, Berry and McArthur’s paper acknowledged the relative influence of eye 
characteristics, skin qualities and features length on people’s social perception. In addition 
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to this review of studies concerning impact of isolated facial cues, the authors do not leave 
aside the importance of the combination of all these single features. Even more complex, 
the impact is fundamental because, when we encounter someone, especially for the first 
time, we see him or her with a global view. The whole face, with all its different and personal 
features, is a non negligible element in the impression others have about us. 
To summarize, Berry and McArthur’s paper (1986) is a good view of what has been done in 
the field of impact of age-related characteristics in the process of social and person 
perception. 
 
In a more recent review, Bodenhausen and Macrae (2006) presented some (maybe all) of 
the studies which would take place in the 5th number of the 24th volume of Social Cognition, 
concerning the part of the face in person perception. Thanks to this article, we can see which 
kinds of studies have been done in 2006 emphasizing the importance of the facial features. 
The authors proposed a short summary of each of the findings. We thus learn that one study 
offers evidence that social context can have an important role in the perception of affective 
signals that the face can possess (Hugenberg & Scezny). Another interesting study is the one 
asking the question of how individuals handle the ambiguity of relevant social group 
membership (Willandse-Jensen & Ito).  The question of the perception’s accuracy concerning 
personality traits (Penton-Voak, Pound, Little & Perrett), the question of the menstrual cycle 
in facial preferences (Koehler, Rhodes, Simmons & Zebrowitz) are also discussed. Finally, a 
comprehensive review of the face literature is presented. The findings of Mason, Cloutier 
and Macrae as well as Blair’s will be presented further on in this dissertation’s theoretical 
review.    
Maddox (2004) has reviewed research investigating racial phenotypicality bias, which can be 
defined as “within-category stereotypes prejudice, and discrimination based on race-related 
phenotypic characteristic of the face” (p.383). We find out that racial bias are the result of 
the thought that dark skin, flat nose, frizzy hair, full lips are not the preferred facial features. 
This idea is well known in many societies and is often used in the evaluation of individuals. It 
thus influences every interaction we have. Individuals are assigned in either social category 
according to the quantity of phenotypical facial features they hold. The level of similarity of 
an individual with regard to his category leads to view him through the lens of category 
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stereotypes and evaluation. This takes a great deal in the social perception process. Maddox, 
in the same paper, deplores that very few studies have been done with the idea that 
variation in physical characteristics can affect race perception. This concept has been either 
ignored or merely rejected in the field of person perception developed by the social 
psychology approach whereas medical, anthropological, sociological and historical fields 
contain an important body of works acknowledging the non negligible role of varied physical 
features.  
 
Nevertheless, some social psychologist researchers studied social perception through the 
lens of racial features impacts. For example, the role of skin tone (Dixon & Maddox, 2005; 
Maddox & Gray, 2002; Maddox & Gray, 2004; Uhlman, Dasgupta, Elgueta, Greenwald, & 
Swanson, 2002), afrocentric features (Blair, 2005; Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002; Blair, 
Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004) and facial cues (Martin & Macrae, 
2007; Mason, Cloutier, & Macrae, 2006) were taken into account in the process of social 
perception.   
A. The Role of Skin Tone 
We will present some researches done in the field of the role skin tone plays in the 
perception of face. These researches emphasise the effective use of skin tone to refine 
people and race categorisation, the evaluations associated with the variation of skin tone, 
the impact of the use of skin tone in crime judgments. Of course, what we present here is far 
from being exhaustive and far from covering all the works done in this field, but it gives us a 
glimpse that can help us understand the role of skin tone. 
Maddox and Gray (2002) conducted two studies that inspected the role of skin tone in the 
representation and perception of Blacks. In the first study, the participants looked at a 
discussion between 6 people and had to form impression of the individuals who took place 
in the discussion. The participants could see who was speaking because every time someone 
said something, his picture appeared. There were two conditions: the race condition (3 black 
men and 3 white men) and the skin tone condition (3 light-skinned black men and 3 dark-
skinned black men). After completing a filler task (list as many of the 50 United States as 
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possible), they had to choose between several pictures of discussants to see whom of them 
made the statement presented below the pictures. They had to do that for all the 
statements made during the discussion. The first study’s conclusion was that people do use 
race as an “organizing principle in social perception” (p.254). This finding emphasises the 
fact that some skin tone-based subcategories of Blacks exist. In a second study, participants 
had to list as many cultural beliefs as possible about a specified group. The groups were 
dark-skinned and light-skinned black women and men, white women and men, and Native 
Americans. The results revealed that positive personality traits were associated with light-
skinned black individuals and negative ones with darker-skinned ones. In addition, 
stereotypic traits were attributed to individuals with dark skin whereas those with lighter 
skin were described with counterstereotypic traits. Counterstereotypic traits are traits that 
are opposite to stereotype traits of Black, for example lazy, aggressive, athletic, rhythmic, 
etc. (Devine, 1989). Moreover, the awareness of stereotypes linked with skin tone is present 
in both black and white participants.  
In the same vein, Maddox and Gray (2004, study 1) conducted a research that aimed at 
proving the link between the skin tone and the social beliefs in memory. In other words, the 
authors tried to investigate the role variation of skin tone plays in the mental representation 
of black people. They hypothesised that if the social context allows beliefs that differentiate 
between light and dark-skinned Blacks to become pertinent, the category salience of skin 
tone would be enhanced, especially if perceivers possess these beliefs. To test their 
hypothesis, they manipulated the relevance of the context by using a theme for a discussion. 
The theme was either about the relations between Black and White in the future (highly 
relevant) or about what to do on a summer day (lightly relevant). As in Maddox and Gray 
(2002), the participants looked at a discussion between 6 people and had to form 
impressions of the individuals who participated in the discussion. There were four conditions 
in this research: the race condition (3 white men and 3 black men) and three replication of 
the skin tone condition (3 light-skinned black men and 3 dark-skinned black men, the skin 
tone of each picture varying across conditions). After the discussion task, they had the same 
filler task than in Maddox and Gray (2002). Finally, they were asked to perform a so-called 
memory task, in which they had to attribute each statement made in the discussion to the 
person who made the statement. The results showed that when the context was highly 
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pertinent, the participants used the skin tone to organise the discussion. It is important to 
note that this effect was found among a sample composed by African American, Asian 
American, European American, Hispanic American and multiracial students, suggesting that 
the use of skin tone is general among ethnically and racially diverse individuals.    
But the skin tone variation is not only used for the Blacks. Ulhman et al. (2002) provided 
evidence of the use of skin tone in the Hispanic population. They conducted a research 
among Hispanics both in the United States and Chile. In the first study, the Hispanic 
Americans’ implicit and explicit attitudes towards the Caucasian, Hispanic as well as towards 
Blanco (light-skinned) and Moreno (dark-skinned) subgroups were observed. The authors 
expected that Hispanic Americans would prefer Blancos over Morenos. They also expected 
that this preference would be expressed both among Blancos and Morenos, although the 
effect would be smaller among Moreno participants because they belong to this subgroup. 
Finally, they hypothesised that Hispanic Americans would not manifest a preference for one 
subgroup over the other. The explicit measures were a feeling thermometer – participants 
had to say how they felt about each of the four groups (Caucasians, Hispanics, Blancos and 
Morenos) on a scale from 0 (cold/unfavourable feelings) to 99 (warm/favourable feelings) – 
and 5 semantic differential scales – 7-points scales (from -3 to +3) anchored at either end by 
opposite adjective pairs (bad-good; ugly-beautiful, etc.). The implicit measures were 
collected by a Blanco-Moreno IAT (Blanco-pleasant/ Moreno-unpleasant and Blanco-
unpleasant/Moreno-pleasant) and a Hispanic-Caucasian IAT (either with Moreno or Blanco 
pictures representing Hispanics). The results showed skin tone bias only for the implicit 
measures. In the IAT a strong preference for the light-skinned (Blanco) Hispanics over the 
darker-skinned ones (Moreno) was revealed. The explicit measures did not reveal such 
preference. The second study was aimed at determining if the results found in the first study 
could be replicated in a Latin American country, specifically in Chile. They wanted to 
demonstrate that the Chileans also prefer Blancos over Morenos, suggesting an implicit skin 
tone prejudice. But, as in the first study, this effect would be smaller among the Morenos. 
Finally, they wanted to determine if Chileans would express explicit preference for Blancos 
over Morenos. The procedure was pretty much the same as in the first study. Globally, the 
two studies illustrated how the intergroup and intragroup attitudes among Hispanics can be 
influenced by the colour of the skin. The implicit bias of preference for the lighter skin colour 
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was present both among American Hispanics and Chileans, although more important in 
magnitude in the Chilean sample. For the explicit measures, only the Chileans expressed a 
preference for the lighter skin colour. 
Dixon and Maddox (2005) explored the role of race and skin tone on individuals facing a 
crime story. They examined the impact of the skin tone of a crime perpetrator on the 
emotional discomfort of the participants as well as their perception and the “memorability” 
of the perpetrator and his victim. The participants faced a white, a light-skinned black, a 
medium-skinned black or dark-skinned black perpetrator. The authors hypothesised that the 
judgments of the crime story in the news would be influenced by “stereotypic associations 
between Blacks and crime involving violence, aggression, dangerousness” (p.1558) present 
in memory. These stereotypic associations would be triggered by the view of a black criminal 
on the news. Moreover, the activation and use of the related stereotype would be amplified 
by the view of a dark-skinned black perpetrator, compared to a lighter skinned one. The last 
hypothesis put forward is that people who often watch news on television will apply more 
frequently the stereotype of black criminal to race and crime phenomena. The participants 
were asked to watch the TV news and then answer a number of memory items about the 
news’ content. After that, they were asked to report their feeling about the crime story as 
well as their perception of the perpetrator and victim. Finally, the frequency at which the 
participants watched the news was assessed by self-report. The results showed that people 
who frequently watch the news on television are more prone to feel emotional discomfort 
when they are presented with a dark-skinned black perpetrator, compared to people who 
watch the television news less frequently. The heavy viewers’ perception of the victim was 
more favourable when the perpetrator was black, whatever the skin tone. The results also 
showed that, whatever the previous exposure to the news, the participants considered that 
the perpetrator’s memorability is greater when he was a dark-skinned black one.  
 
What we can conclude from this is that it seems that skin tone is used to organise discussion 
and have stereotype social beliefs associated with it, that individuals prefer a lighter skin 
tone over a darker one, that this preference can elicit stereotypes and prejudices that are 
associated with and that can have an impact on social judgments. 
30 
 
B. Afrocentric Features 
Afrocentric features are “the features that distinguish African Americans from other groups” 
(Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002, p.7). All the studies we present here are made by Irene 
Blair and colleagues. As in the section concerning the role of skin tone, the researches we 
decided to present are not the only ones in the field of use of Afrocentric features, but they 
are quite interesting for our understanding of the importance of face in social interaction.  
Blair, Judd, Sadler and Jenkins (2002) conducted a study that aimed at testing the hypothesis 
that physical attributes related to a group can directly activate the stereotype associated 
with this group. In the first study, the aim was to demonstrate, among others, that people 
can reliably judge the extent to which a face presents Afrocentric features. The faces used in 
this study were both European American and African American ones. The aim of this first 
study was also to take a look at the connection between Afrocentric features and baby-
faceness and attractiveness, which were prominently present in facial discrimination. For 
each presented face, the participants had to make three judgment features: baby-faceness, 
attractiveness and Eurocentric and Afrocentric features. They then had to rapidly classify 
faces as belonging to the Eurocentric category or the Afrocentric category. The result 
indicated that the Eurocentric and Afrocentric faces could be reliably classified according to 
the degree of Afrocentric features they possessed. Three additional studies were conducted 
aiming at making obvious the fact that participants spontaneously joined together 
Afrocentric features with the characteristics that are stereotypic of African Americans in the 
United States’ society. In the second study, the participants received a written description of 
a person. They were then asked to mentally visualise the person who was described in the 
text. They were then presented with 23 faces (which were constantly categorised as African 
American in the first study) and they had to say to what extent the photograph could be that 
of the person who was described beforehand. They had to do this judgment for four 
different descriptions, always using the same 23 photographs. After that, they were asked to 
judge the 23 faces according to their attractiveness and the level of Afrocentric features they 
possessed. Finally, they were asked to judge the four descriptions and say to what extent 
they thought the person described was nice, to what point they wanted to be friends with 
him and to what extent they thought that the public in general would think he was typically 
African American. The results confirmed the hypothesis that the more the African Americans 
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possessed Afrocentric features, the more they were viewed as likely to fit with the negative 
stereotypic description (compared to ones who possessed less Afrocentric features). The 
third study was a replica of the second one with the only exception that the faces used here 
were exclusively European American ones. The authors expected that, even under this 
condition, the faces that possessed more Afrocentric features would be judged as having 
more chances to be the person described in the stereotypic description of African Americans 
rather than in the counterstereotypic one.  This hypothesis was confirmed by the results 
when there was a control for both the attractiveness of the face and the accessibility of its 
racial category. The last study was done expecting to show the role of the Afrocentric 
features when the faces of both racial categories were assessed. The procedure was the 
same as in the second and third studies, but with both European American and African 
American faces. The results showed that the Afrocentric characteristics played a role in the 
participants’ judgment of determining whether faces possessed African American 
stereotypic attributes, regardless of the target’s racial category as well as the accessibility of 
this category. This effect was also found in an intergroup context, which should have 
increased the perception of intergroup differences and diminished the intragroup variation.  
Overall, the experiments pointed out the fact that people manifesting more Afrocentric 
features were more likely to be judged as having more traits that are stereotypic of African 
Americans than counterstereotypic ones. 
In their study, Blair, Judd and Chapleau (2004a) wanted to know if the fact that a person 
manifesting more Afrocentric features and judged as more stereotypic of African Americans 
could have an impact in the sphere of criminal sentencing. The results of this investigation 
found evidence that Blacks and Whites, with an equivalent history of crime, received pretty 
much the same kind of sentence. However, criminals with more Afrocentric features were 
more severely punished than those with less Afrocentric features. This effect appeared 
whether the criminal was black or white. We learn that this use of Afrocentric features is 
relatively unconscious. People thus cannot control it. The differences in sentencing are not 
visible when considering the race, because people learned to control their racial stereotype, 
but are visible when examining within the race. The level of Afrocentric features having an 
influence then.   
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Blair, Judd and Fallman (2004b) conducted a research aimed at studying the automaticity of 
stereotyping based on race and (within-race) Afrocentric features. The results indicated that 
these two stereotyping processes could be used even under highly restricted resources 
conditions. These two processes, though, differ in the sense that participants are fully aware 
that they are using race and can thus control it. On the contrary, participants are not 
conscious of their use of Afrocentric features and thus, cannot control it, even when the 
process is fully explained to them and when they have the possibility to recognise the 
pertinent features. The first experiment started from the idea that the automaticity of a 
process is assessed by its level of efficiency. If the process is efficient under conditions 
demanding high attentional resources for another task than the process itself, then it can be 
considered as automatic (Bargh, 1994, in Blair et al., 2004b). The hypothesis tested in this 
first study was that the more participants have to use attentional resources (high attentional 
load), the more race-based stereotyping will be elicited. They used the same procedure as in 
Blair et al. (2002). The participants were distributed in two conditions: high and low 
attentional load. The participants in the low-load condition had to read four descriptions and 
then judge the probability of each of 40 faces (20 European Americans and 20 African 
Americans) to be the person in the description. The participants in the high-load condition, 
in addition to the judgment task, had to press the spacebar every time the letter sequence 
GXQ appeared on the picture (on the tee-shirt of the photographed target). The results 
showed that both race and Afrocentric features influenced the participants’ judgment of the 
target. The African American faces were more frequently associated with the negative 
stereotypic description than the European American ones. The faces (European or African 
Americans) possessing the most Afrocentric features were also more frequently associated 
with a negative stereotypic description. It is worth noting that the attentional load during 
the task had no impact on the degree to which the participants used the Afrocentric 
features, suggesting that in contrast with the use of race-base stereotypes, the use of 
Afrocentric features are used all the time, not regarding the level of attentional resources 
needed. In the second experiment, the effect of explicitly demanding not to use the 
stereotype is examined. The participants were asked to avoid the use of stereotypes in the 
task. The results showed an impact of this instruction of suppression only for the race-based 
stereotypes. No effect was found for the Afrocentric features’ use. In a third experiment, 
they wanted to know whether the explicit explanation of the specific associations that 
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participants had to avoid could moderate the use of race-based stereotypes and Afrocentric 
features. Moreover, they changed the instructions by adding the fact that the use of both 
positive and negative stereotypes should be avoided. They randomly assigned participants 
into three conditions: suppression of race-based stereotypes, suppression of Afrocentric 
features stereotypes and no suppression (in which participants were not asked to avoid the 
use of stereotyping). The instructions turned out to be efficient in the race condition but not 
in the Afrocentric features condition, even though participants were clearly asked not to use 
these features. They were incapable of doing so. Finally, the fourth experiment used the 
same procedure than in the other studies, but before performing the judgment task, 
participants had to assess the level of Afrocentric features each of the 40 faces (used in the 
previous experiments) possessed. They were then separated into two conditions: 
suppression of Afrocentric features stereotypes and no instructions of suppression. In the 
judgment task, the faces used were not the same as in the previous experiment (because 
they were used in the first step of the fourth experiment) but were highly similar to them. 
Once again, the results revealed that the suppression of Afrocentric features stereotypes did 
not show a moderator effect on the use of these characteristics, even though participants 
did prove that they could reliably identify Afrocentric features on the 40 faces of the first 
step of the experiment. 
Finally, Blair (2006) wanted to know if the extraction and the use of Afrocentric features are 
possible and efficient in case of inverted faces. A pilot study was conducted to assure that 
people could correctly perceive the pertinent facial characteristics when the faces were 
upturned. The results of this pilot study demonstrated the ability of the perceivers to extract 
pertinent characteristics from inverted faces to determine race, degree of Afrocentric 
features and attractiveness, when they had their attention focused on these characteristics. 
For the study, the participants had to read four descriptions and assess to what extent 30 
faces could be the person depicted in the description. The comparison between inverted 
faces condition and upright faces showed that the stereotyping resisted to the inversion of 
the faces. But, as in the other researches of Blair et al (2002, 2004a, 2004b), the effect was 




What we can learn from all these studies is that people seem unconscious of the process of 
stereotyping based on the use of Afrocentric features and thus are incapable of not using the 
Afrocentric features when they are forming impressions of others. This is true not only for 
African American faces but also for European American ones. This effect was found in the 
criminal sentencing area, where people attributed a heavier sentence to those with more 
Afrocentric features, and whatever the race category. 
C. Facial Cues 
Sczesny and Kühnen (2004) demonstrated that physical appearance could have an impact on 
leadership competence attribution. They found that the more one has a masculine facial 
appearance, the more one will be assessed as being leadership competent. This effect of 
physical appearance seems to be quite robust because, even if people are motivated not to 
use this kind of gender stereotype, their judgment is clearly influenced by this bias. 
Afrocentric features are thus not the only cues we use in the face when we meet someone. 
Other facial cues, such as hair colour, nose length, eye shape and so forth, are exploited to 
determine the race, sex, and age of individuals we encounter. In this section, we will present 
two researches which studied the impact of facial cues in social interactions. Again, other 
researches exist in the field of the facial cues impact that take place in this section, but the 
ones we present here are sufficient to illustrate our topic.  
The first research we will present was conducted by Mason, Cloutier and Macrae (2006). The 
purpose was to determine whether the mere presence of faces could enhance the 
accessibility of sex categories and gender stereotypes.  The first experiment examined the 
possibility of people classifying faces in relation to sex despite the determination of ignoring 
it. The participants faced a computer screen on which a name (masculine or feminine) was 
written surrounded by four pictured faces (either 1 face + 3 blurred faces; 2 faces + 2 blurred 
faces or 4 faces) in each corner of the screen. The associated name-pictures were either 
consistent (e.g. feminine name and women’s pictures) or inconsistent (e.g. masculine name 
and women’s pictures). The participants were asked to tell whether the name was feminine 
or masculine and had to ignore the photographs surrounding the names. The results 
revealed that the classification of the names by sex was moderated by the presence of the 
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face(s). The higher the number of faces incoherent with the name (1, 2 or 4), the more the 
interference level was important. This result suggested that despite the desire of paying no 
attention to the faces, the facial cues played a part in the perceivers’ behaviour.  In the 
second experiment, the procedure was the same as used in the first one but instead of 
listing names by sex, they had to classify words as stereotypic of men or women. The 
intention of this experiment was to find out whether the mere exposure to a face could be 
sufficient to trigger stereotypes associated with it and whether the number of faces 
presented could have an impact on the degree of interference (as in the first experiment). 
The results partially confirmed the expectations. The mere presence of a face was enough to 
trigger gender-related information and the stereotypes that were associated with it. Yet, this 
effect was not modulated by the number of faces presented on the computer screen. The 
overall results for this research proved that merely being exposed to faces could elicit sex 
categories and gender stereotypes. This is of importance because it means that the face can 
impact the social interactions of individuals and thus influence their behaviour in such 
interactions. 
The second research we wish to present was carried out by Martin and Macrae (2007). They 
wanted to know whether a face with or without hair could have an impact on measures of 
sex categorisation. They looked at the ease with which information could be extracted from 
faces by varying the visibility of the face (by blurring it gradually). They hypothesised, on the 
basis of one of their researches (Macrae & Martin, in press, cited in Martin & Macrae, 2007), 
that “if the spontaneous categorisation is driven by the detection of a dominant sex-
specifying cue, then the removal of the cue should impede the emergence of this effect” 
(p.809) (i.e., category activation). To test this hypothesis, the participants had to establish 
whether a face presented was a masculine or a feminine one. The 288 presented faces were 
either with or without hair. The same face was seen by the participants twice, once with 
hair, once without hair. The degree to which the faces were blurred varied. Half of the 
participants were primed with masculine or feminine faces (with or without hair, with a 
varied degree of blurring) before starting the recognition task. The prime-target association 
was either coherent (both masculine faces) or incoherent (masculine prime with feminine 
target). The results revealed that, for the priming categorisation, participants were faster to 
determine the target face’s gender when the association between target and prime was 
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coherent. This effect did not appear when the face had no hair. We can deduct from this 
study that participants were capable of identifying the sex of the blurred face, but only if 
sex-related facial cues were present. Thus the automatic categorisation of faces is impaired 
when facial cues, such as hair, are absent. Only the explicit categorisation is not impaired by 
the removal of hair. Thus, we can learn from this study that the automatic categorisation is 
inevitable when sex-specifying cues are present. But when these cues are removed, the 
automatic categorisation does not occur. This proves the importance of facial cues in the 
person perception process. 
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II. THE ULTIMATUM GAME 
1. What Is the Ultimatum Game? 
The principle of the Ultimatum Game is that a proposer offers a way to share money with 
the receiver. The latter can either accept or refuse the deal. If he accepts, both players will 
receive the money according to the kind of split. If the receiver refuses the proposer’s offer, 
then both will not receive any money. The kind of offers varied from fair to most unfair.  
In general, fair offers are more or less 45% of the total initial monetary amount. Unfair offers 
are about 30% of the total initial amount and most unfair offers are just 20% of the total 
amount. Koenig & Tranel (2007) say that “rational actor” (p.951) models predict that the 
receiver would take on whichever offer of money. The perfect equilibrium principle in the 
Ultimatum Game holds three postulates (Bolton & Zwick, 1995):  
“P1: each player prefers having more money to having less 
P2: first movers know P1 
P3: first movers can calculate the optimal offer” (p.97) 
Thus, the proposer makes an offer that cannot be refused by the receiver (because of P1) 
and then offers the smallest amount of money allowed. The receiver should accept because 
of P1. But across diverse studies, this does not seem to be the case (Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, & Sefton, 1994; see Thaler, 1988 and Güth, 1995, for a review). Camerer (2003) says 
that “offers are typically around 50% of the total amount, and 50% of lower offers are 
rejected” (p.1673), acknowledging that players do not play according to the perfect 
equilibrium. He does not specify exactly from which percentage on offers are not accepted. 
Güth and Schmittberger (1982) assert that offers of about 20% of the total sum are rejected 




2. The “Abnormal” Players’ Economic Behaviour  
In his review, Güth (1995) noticed that, across the studies he conducted, “the main 
tendencies observed were that responders are willing to sacrifice substantial amounts to 
punish a greedy proposer and that this is well anticipated by most proposers who, on 
average, ask only for 1/3 of the cake” (p.331). According to all the researches cited by Koenig 
& Tranel (2007), “the irrational rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game in normal 
individuals is driven by an emotional response to unfair treatment” (p.951). The fact that we 
are human beings explains why we prefer receiving nothing rather than being swindled. 
Humans are not driven by a rational cognitive process in case of unfairness.  
3. The Role of Emotions 
Camerer (2003) says in his paper that a new field of study is called “behavioural economics”, 
using the great progresses in psychology and neurosciences. This field acknowledges the 
great impact of emotion and psychological processes on decision-making.  
Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom and Cohen (2003) have found that unfair offers draw out 
activity in brain areas connected with emotion and cognition, emphasising then the 
important role of emotion in decision-making. These findings permit integrating emotion 
and cognition into economic models as important influences in the daily decision and 
choices process.  
Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer and Fehr (2006) found that the disorder in the right 
dorsolateral cortex has consequences on subjects’ willingness to accept unfair offers. People 
with this kind of disorder are more willing to accept unfair offers. Both plausible hypotheses 
presented in this research emphasised the fact that the Ultimatum Game is related to 
emotional reactions.   
Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, Lieberman and Robbins (2008) demonstrated that “manipulating 5-
HT functions, which has long been implicated in social behaviour, can selectively alter 
reactions to unfairness in a laboratory model of self-regulation.” (p.1739). Reprisals to 
unfairness are greater when the 5-HT levels are lowered.  
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Koenig & Tarnel (2007) showed that the ventromedial cortex, associated with emotion 
regulation, is critical for normal economic behaviour. Once this brain area is damaged, 
people tend to have a “hyper-irrational rejection of unfair Ultimatum offers” (p.954). Thus, 
these findings suggest that the decision-making behaviour could be modified by a damaged 
emotion controlling area. In this study, people with VMPC lesion were more irrational than 
normal individuals and brain-damaged (outside of VMPC) subjects. They accepted even less 
unfair offers than the irrational normal person. 
Haselhuhn and Mellers (2005) examined what kind of payoffs would procure pleasure to 
players in the Ultimatum Game and whether these payoffs would induce more cooperation 
from them. In order to find out, the authors asked the participants to choose, among several 
offers, which ones they preferred. They also asked participants to imagine what pleasure 
they would feel from each potential payoff. We could see from the results that participants 
who took their pleasure in generous offers tended to be fairer in their proposals and thus 
lead to more cooperation and less selfishness. We also could observe that the participants 
who used what the authors called the “strategic pleasure”, that is “the expected pleasure of 
an offer (either accepted or rejected)” (p.26) were more strategic and thus more selfish in 
their behaviours. They did not feel any or not much pleasure when they were confronted to 
fair offers. On the contrary, the participants who derived pleasure from fairness tended to 
play in a fairer manner and then used a “non-strategic pleasure”, that is the imagined 
pleasure of an accepted offer” (p.26). These participants were more cooperative and less 
selfish than the ones using a strategic pleasure. This shows us that emotions have a great 
influence on cooperation. The more people felt pleasure from fairness, the fairer they would 
play.  
 
All these studies are evidence for the non negligible role of emotions in the decision-making 




4. The Role of Fairness 
In a less brain-related view, lots of researchers studied the role of (un)fairness (Forsythe, 
Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Bethwaite & Tompkinson, 1996; Harrison & McCabe, 1996; 
Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 1996; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Haselhuhn & Mellers, 2005), 
and punishment (Bolton & Zwick, 1995) in bargaining experiments.  
Bethwaite and Tompkinson (1996) distributed a questionnaire to participants asking them 
what they were willing to offer or to accept in an Ultimatum Game on a $10 basis. The 
authors wanted, among others, to determine what exactly comes into play in an Ultimatum 
Game. Is it envy, selfishness, fairness or altruism? They used a questionnaire instead of a real 
game observation because it is a better way to know the participant’s game intentions. The 
inconvenient is that because it is about intentions and not actions, it is difficult to know 
exactly what the participants would really do in a real Ultimatum Game. The results showed 
that over half of the participants expressed an interest in fairness which represented more 
than those who were driven by envy or altruism. Fairness seemed to be a motivation in an 
Ultimatum Game play.  
Some other researchers studied the role of fairness in the Ultimatum Game.  
Pillutla and Murnighan (1996), for instance, found that unfairness led to anger and then to a 
greater probability of rejecting offers. When receivers could assess the fairness of their 
offers and attribute the responsibility of unfairness to the perceiver, rejection of offers were 
more frequent. In addition, they found that anger better explained the rejections than the 
perceived unfairness of offers. Despite the fact that anger was a better explanation of 
rejection, the experiment showed that unfairness had an impact on the decision-making 
process of the players.  
However, Forsythe et al. (1994) found out that perception of fairness by itself could not fully 
explain the willingness of the players to make non-trivial offers. But how could we explain 
this “abnormal” behaviour if fairness was not the motive of rejecting offers? Forsythe et al. 
(1994) proposed that there are different types of players. Some are “pure gamesmen and 
others are concerned (to varying degrees) with fairness” (p.362). This is proposed to be 
present in both proposer and receiver players.  
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In a same way, Harrison et al. (1996) discovered that the hypothesis of fairness could explain 
data but was not sufficient. They found that the taste of fairness was not a satisfactory 
explanation of the players’ behaviour in bargaining games without taking into account the 
expectations of the players. When players knew the beliefs, rationality and motives of other 
players, they were more willing to accept lower offers.  
Nowak et al. (2000) found that fairness could explain behaviour when information of what 
kind of players participants were playing with was available. Their results revealed that when 
participants learned that other players would know which kind of player they were, the 
tendency to only accept a fair offer was visible. If receivers accepted low offers, they knew 
that proposers would know about it and then made only small offers in the future. The 
receivers wanted to have the reputation of somebody who only accepted fair offers, so they 
tended to reject too small offers. Proposers knowing this reputation could tend to make 
more fair offers. This effect was not visible when participants could not find out what kind of 
player they were playing with.  
Nevertheless, when punishment of the unfair proposer is possible, fairness is a good 
explanation of the “non reasonable” reactions of receivers. Bolton and Zwick (1995) 
proposed that a player could want to punish proposers who were offering a too unfair part 
of the pie. Thus, the “preference for more money is modified by a preference for 
disagreement over amounts he [the receiver] perceives as small relative to his playing 
partner’s share” (p.100). When the offer of a proposer was evaluated as unfair by the 
receiver, the rejection of this offer was a way to punish the unfair behaviour of the proposer. 




5. The Effect of Gender 
Gender can also have an impact on the decision-making process in the Ultimatum Game. 
Solnick (2001) examined gender differences in the Ultimatum Game. When the players’ sex 
was known, receivers acted differently. Men were offered more money than women, 
especially from women proposers. Women were thus more generous towards men than 
towards women. This effect was also observed in men but in a less strong way. It was also 
revealed by the results that women never rejected an offer made by men. However, when 
two women faced each other in the game, the rejection rate was higher (23%). Despite the 
fact that they accepted all the men’s offers, women chose higher minimum acceptable sums 
than men. Thus women acted in a different way when facing a male or a female counterpart.   
Eckel and Grossman (2001) did not find exactly the same results. Rather than showing a 
greater generosity toward men than toward women, results of their study revealed that 
women played in a “solidarity” way. The offers made by women were less often rejected and 
female receivers rejected offers less often than men. Results also revealed that men acted in 
a “chivalrous” way. When facing a woman, they accepted their proposals more often and 
proposed them a more generous share of the pie.    
Small, Babcok, Gelfand and Gettman (2007) studied reactions of men and women in 
negotiations. Five studies were conducted. The first was aimed at discovering whether 
individuals would demand more money in a situation where the possibility of negotiation 
was not made explicit. Thus, it was expected that only individuals who could initiate a 
negotiation would receive more money than the initial monetary payment, whereas 
negotiation was not an offered explicit possibility. The participants had to carry out a task. At 
the end of it, instructions told them that they would be paid between 3$ and 10$. The 
experimenter entered the room and gave the participants 3$ and asked if 3$ was ok. If the 
participants asked for more, they received 10$ because they entered negotiation. If they did 
not ask for more, they received 3$. The results revealed that, despite a weak percentage of 
greater payment, men asked significantly more often than women to receive more than the 
proposed payment of 3$. This effect is due neither to task performance nor to perceived 
performance. Women are less comfortable in a situation of initiating negotiation because 
the language used to initiate is not linked to the language they are used to speak, namely 
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politeness and kindness. The fourth study showed that women were more comfortable in a 
situation where the possibility of asking, rather than negotiating, for more money was 
offered. The gap between men and women demanding for more money was thus reduced to 
nothing. This effect was explained by the fact that women were at ease in a situation in 
which the language used was more polite and kind, which was more appropriate for them. 
We also learn from the third study that women evaluated the situation of negotiation as 
more intimidating than the situation of asking. But when the notion of power was primed, 
women did not see a difference between negotiating and asking. Women evaluated 
negotiation as less intimidating after a prime of power.  Overall, this research suggested that 
the difference between men and women concerning the initiation of negotiation depended 
on conditions (asking or negotiating) and context.   
To continue on the power impact in the Ultimatum Game, Hadgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, 
Wilke and De Dreu (2008) investigated the impact of power differences and related 
expectation in social decision making. The results of this research revealed that when power 
was favourable to proposers, they allocated lower offers. Surprisingly, when the receivers 
were powerless, offers were more generous. This could be explained by the fact that when 
individuals were powerless, a feeling of social responsibility appeared. The proposers were 
more generous when receivers were powerless than when they possessed less power. On 
the other hand, receivers preferred to be weakly powerful than not powerful at all. They also 
expected to be treated more favourably when having weak power than when having none. 
Allocators were driven by a social responsibility norm holding that the powerless could not 
be abused. Receivers, on the contrary, thought that even weak power would bring them 
more than total absence of power.  
Macfarlan and Quinlan (2008) conducted a study in Dominica that aimed at looking at the 
effects of family and kin on altruistic behaviours. Results highlighted an effect of gender in 
the Ultimatum Game. The participants played a classic Ultimatum Game, once as allocators, 
once as responders. The relationships between the members of the village were expected to 
influence the level of the offers and the level of the players’ acceptation. Strong 
relationships between the members would be positively linked to making offers and 
inversely linked to acceptation. Although the hypothesis was not globally confirmed, the 
authors found a difference between men and women. For instance, results revealed that the 
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number of brothers had a different impact according to the fact that the participant was a 
man or a woman. The more brothers women had, the lower their offers tended to be. The 
opposite was observed in men, the more brothers they had, the greater their offers tended 
to be. The same effect was observed when the number of grandparents and the father’s 
presence in the village were taken into account. Women tended to make less important 
offers than men the higher the number of grandparents and brothers was, as well as when 
the father was present in the village.            
6. The Effect of Facial Attractiveness 
As already hinted at in the facial cues section, physical appearance can have a great impact 
on social interactions. Facial attractiveness has also been studied as having an impact on 
relationships between men and women. Here we will present some studies which took into 
account the effect of attractiveness in social exchange and in (Takahashi, Yamagishi, Tanida, 
Kiyonari, & Kanazawa, 2006) Ultimatum Game. Although they also present gender-effect, we 
decided to leave them in this section, in order to organise our report. 
In 1971, Kahn, Hottes and Davis examined the behaviours of men and women in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Half of the participants could win more money by choosing cooperation 
and the other half could win extra money by choosing the competitive option. In the first 
study, 40 participants were paired with same-sex partners whereas in the second study, 80 
participants played with persons of the opposite gender, whose physical attractiveness 
changed. The results of the first study indicated that men were more cooperative than 
women, who were more competitive. Men seemed to be more motivated by a greater 
benefit (allowed by the cooperative solution) than women, who chose the competitive 
option more often. Women were however more cooperative when they were paired with a 
man rather than with a woman. Even though it was just a tendency, women were more 
likely to cooperate when facing an attractive rather than an unattractive partner. Only for 
ugly women the significant effect of physical attractiveness appeared. Those women played 
in a more cooperative way when their partners were attractive men rather than unattractive 
ones.   
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Solnick and Schweitzer (1999) also studied the effect of gender and physical attractiveness, 
in the Ultimatum Game. They hypothesised that attractive people would be offered more 
money than less attractive ones. Moreover, they expected attractive people to ask for more 
money than unattractive ones. They also hypothesised that men would receive more money 
from their partner than women and that they also would ask for more money than women. 
Interactions between attractiveness and gender were expected too, namely that the 
difference between offers made to attractive men and unattractive ones would be greater 
than the difference between offers proposed to attractive women and unattractive ones. 
The same hypothesis was expressed about the difference between the demands of 
attractive and unattractive men and women. The results of their experiments showed that, 
in general, attractive individuals were proposed a greater amount of money than 
unattractive ones. The same effect appeared for men, who received more money than 
women. The results also revealed that offers were less often rejected when they came from 
men rather than women and from attractive rather than unattractive players. Even though 
more was asked from them, attractive men were treated differently than other players, 
namely they received more money and their offers were more often accepted. 
Takahashi, Yamagishi, Tanida, Kiyonari and Kanazawa (2006) also found an effect of 
attractiveness in social exchange. The games they used were not the Ultimatum Game but 
they implied cooperation and the results could be interesting for our presentation. They 
found that attractive men were less cooperative than unattractive ones. This effect of self-
attractiveness was not found in women. Albeit this study did not speak about the effect of 
physical attractiveness of player 1 on behaviour of player 2, it demonstrated that physical 
attractiveness did have an impact on the way people might play and behave in a situation 




7. Other Effects 
In a totally different way, Zaatari and Trivers (2007) found that body symmetry has an 
impact on behaviours during an Ultimatum Game play. This study is an evidence of the 
impact of physical appearance (body symmetry) in an Ultimatum Game. The more 
symmetrical the body of a Jamaican player, the less cooperative he was. Symmetrical 
Jamaican men were less cooperative and made less generous offers than asymmetrical 
Jamaican men. 
Murnighan and Saxon (1998) studied the behaviour of children in the Ultimatum Game. The 
results showed that younger children proposed a more generous share of the pie than older 
ones. Furthermore, the more they grew in age, the less they tended to accept lower offers 
(except for college students). In general, girls were more generous and fairer than boys. 
Thus, age seemed to have an effect on the type of behaviour players would have when 
playing an Ultimatum Game.  
Henrich (2000) demonstrated that the culture, in which players are, could matter a great 
deal in the way they would play an Ultimatum Game. He found some evidences to prove 
that people from Los Angeles did behave differently than the Machiguenga, who live all the 
way through the south-eastern Peruvian Amazon’s tropical forests. Their expectations of 
fairness and punishment were quite different from those of Los Angeles people. The 
Machiguenga did not expect any kind of equality in the share of the money, neither as 
allocator, nor as receiver. 
 
Fairness is thus an explanation of the players’ behaviour in an Ultimatum Game but does not 
seem to be the only one. The participants are not driven by a sense of fairness only; 
behaviours can also be explained by anger, source of pleasure, age, type of players, players’ 






III. HOW ARE ULTIMATUM GAME, BENEVOLENT SEXISM, AND 
FACE REGOGNITION RELATED? 
As we learn from the facial cues section (p.34), facial characteristics of men and women have 
an impact on other people’s judgment. Moreover, we have learned that this use of facial 
characteristics is relatively unconscious and people usually can’t help it (Blair et al. 2002, 
2004a, 2004b). We think that facial cues associated with sexism (BS or HS) are also used by 
individuals although they are not aware of that use.  
Research on the Ultimatum Game has shown that one is influenced by the physical 
appearance of the people one is playing with (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007). We thus start from 
the idea that if physical appearance and facial features matter a great deal on other people’s 
judgments, then so would benevolent and hostile sexist facial cues. We therefore suggest 
that those facial cues present on male faces would influence relationships with women, 
especially the women’s attitude to men. The extent to which male faces possess BS or HS 
facial cues would have an impact on the women’s judgments of men.  
Being a part of the physical appearance, attractiveness is thought to matter a great deal in 
the decision-making process. According to Solnick and Schweitzer (1999), men and attractive 
people were treated differently by participants, although no significant differences were 
found between proposals and the minimum acceptable amount attractive people made. The 
results of their study revealed that attractive people were offered more money than 
unattractive ones, but more money was asked from them. Men also were offered more 
money than women, but less was asked from them. Women were more generous in their 
offers than men. We also notice that rejection rates were more important for men and for 
attractive people. In addition, offers were also less often rejected when they came from men 
than when they were made by women. Offers were also less often rejected when they 
stemmed from attractive rather than unattractive people. Globally, what is interesting to 
remember from this study, is that being attractive has an impact because one will be offered 
more money than if one is unattractive. This effect is also true when one is a man rather 
than a woman. Being a man and, an attractive one at that, would lead women to act in a 




Lots of factors may have an influence on how players would behave in an Ultimatum Game. 
We therefore suggest that the decisions players would make in an UG will be influenced by 
the BS facial cues of player 1 (male proposer). In addition, it was repeatedly demonstrated 
that the individuals’ BS level has an important effect on their behaviour. We thus propose 
that decisions made in the UG will be influenced by the BS level of the second player (female 
receiver). Being inspired by the results of Sarlet and Dardenne (in preparation) and those 
from Bodart’s thesis (2008) stating that the subcomponents of BS (PP, CGD, IH) can each 
have a distinct effect, we suggest that the three subcomponents of BS would have their own 
consequence on the decision making process. The impact of PP would not be similar to the 
one of IH and CDG.  
As Moya et al. (2007) have demonstrated in their study, context has a non negligible effect 
on the acceptation of men’s BS restrictions to women. We thus think that behaviours and 
decisions in the UG would be different according to the context players would be in. Women 
would react differently depending on whether they are in a romantic or an occupational 
context. 
Furthermore, fair and very unfair offers generally have a clear rate of rejection/acceptation. 
Offers that share the pie in a fifty/fifty part have a quite high acceptation rate. Very unfair 
offers in contrast present quite a high rate of rejection because players would rather get 
nothing than being fooled. Even if we have learned from the gender effects’ section in the 
Ultimatum Game that most of the time, women do not reject men’s offers (Solnick, 2001), 
we nevertheless think that rejection rates for very unfair offers would be high and clearly 
marked. Unlike fair and very unfair offers, unfair ones could be considered ambiguous 
because one cannot really decide whether this kind of offer is fair or very unfair. Decisions 
would be difficult to make and thus rejection/acceptation rates may be less clear. 
Consequently, we consider that it would be in that kind of offers that the previously 
discussed influences in the UG (facial cues, context, players’ and faces’ level of BS, and 




IV. HYPOTHESES  
Starting from the links made in the previous section, we elaborated several hypotheses: 
 
1. Because unfair offers are ambiguous2 (the participants do not know exactly whether the 
offer is a fair one or not), we predict that when confronted with unfair offers, the 
participants will take more time deciding, whether to accept or reject it. 
 
We expect that a contextual effect will appear only when unfair offers are presented. We 
also expect that fair and very unfair offers would initiate clear reactions (a high percentage 
of acceptation in the former and a weak percentage of acceptation in the latter); so the next 
hypotheses will focus on unfair offers only.  
Attractiveness has been shown as having an influence on the way of playing in an Ultimatum 
Game (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). In the exact same direction, we expect that physical 
attractiveness of allocators would impact the decision making process of women receivers. 
 
2. The more the pictured male’s face is attractive, the greater the acceptation of unfair offers.  
 
When we prime a romantic context, the idea of intimacy is activated. In intimacy, women 
expect men to be kind and helpful with them (Rudman & Heppen, 2003; Moya et al., 2007). 
Thus, we expect that in a romantic context, when the participants receive an unfair offer 
(ambiguous situation), they will feel a gap between the kind of offer and their expectations. 
This result leads us to our third hypothesis.  
 
3. There would be less acceptation in the romantic context than in the occupational context 
when controlling for attractiveness. 
 
                                                             
2 This term results from a discussion between my faculty advisor, Benoit Dardenne, Marie Sarlet, and me. 
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Sarlet and Dardenne (in preparation, study 3) have shown that women prescribe more 
Protective Paternalism in a romantic context than in an occupational one. They have also 
shown that in a romantic context, PP is seen more as intimacy than paternalism when 
women are strongly in need for Heterosexual Intimacy. Hence, they would expect kindness 
and help from men in a romantic context and ambiguous offers would not meet this 
expectation. Our fourth hypothesis stems from this statement. 
 
4.  
a) In a romantic context, the higher the level of participants on the subscale of intimate 
heterosexuality (IH) in the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996, see Dardenne et al., 2006, for a French 
validation), the greater their rejection of unfair offers, when controlling for attractiveness. 
The remaining faces’ characteristics (Hostile Sexism, Protective Paternalism, and 
Complementary Gender Differentiation) will not be a subject for any hypothesis. 
b) In a romantic context, the higher the level of participants on the subscale of IH in the ASI, the 
shorter the delay in reacting to reject an unfair offer. 
c) In a romantic context, the higher the faces’ characteristics on the subscale of intimate 
heterosexuality (IH) in the ASI, the greater the rejection of unfair offers by the participants. 
The remaining faces’ characteristics (HS, PP, and CGD) will not be a subject for a hypothesis. 
d) In a romantic context, the more participants score high on the IH subscale of the ASI and the 
higher faces’ characteristics on the subscale of intimate heterosexuality (IH) in the ASI, the 




Sarlet and Dardenne (in preparation, study 1) found that both men and women prescribe 
more paternalism in a romantic context than in a professional one. Thus, women expected 




a) In an occupational context, the higher the level of participants on the subscale of protective 
paternalism in the ASI, the greater the rejection of unfair offers by the participants.  












1. Participants  
Forty-nine female students of the University of Liège were recruited on the campus. Another 
participant was a kindergarten teacher. The University students came from several different 
faculties (psychology, political sciences, law, social sciences, etc.). The average age was 21.88 
years with a SD of 2.06. We first told them that they were about to participate in a 25 
minutes experiment that consisted in a little bargaining computer game in which they were 
to accept or refuse offers from other players. We told them that they also had to fill in three 
questionnaires. If a female participant could do it in next 25 minutes, we took her to a lab at 
the Faculty of Psychology. If she had no time, we arranged to meet when she could come 
and meet us. We exchanged our respective cell phone numbers to keep in touch. We used 
those numbers to remind each other the time and place of our appointment.  
Once we were in the lab, the participants first signed a statement of agreement3 to the 
effect that they accepted to take part in the experiment. We told them that they could quit 
the experiment whenever they wanted, without even giving a reason. The participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (romantic versus occupational context). 
2. Materials and Procedure 
Once the statement of agreement signed, we told each participant that we had built 
software in which we had placed photographs of real people we photographed previously. 
We also told them that we had asked those persons to make a € 20 offer.  We explained that 
those people were playing a game in which they were given € 20. We insisted on the fact 
that these € 20 were not real, that they belonged to no-one. We added that they would play 
a game in which they would choose whether to accept or to reject offers that these 
previously photographed real people had made.  
                                                             
3 The agreement was obtained in a way approved by the University of Liège committee of ethics 
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After that, we asked the participant if she would agree to be photographed so we could 
continue the experiment, and if she could write us an offer in case the roles were reversed, 
that is, if she was the one receiving the € 20 and was to share them with another player. We 
insisted on the fact that this other player could be anyone, someone she might know or not, 
a girl or a boy, thin or fat, big or small, handsome or not, etc. We wanted to know what kind 
of offer she would make4. For the picture, we asked each participant to go and stand against 
the door so we could have a white background. We asked the participants to be 
photographed and to write an offer because we wanted the experiment to be as realistic as 
possible. We told the participants that they would face an actual player who would make 
them real offers, thus we asked them to do exactly the same thing so they could believe the 
game was real. 
After the picture was taken and the offer written, we invited the participant to complete two 
questionnaires before starting the game. The first questionnaire was made up of 
demographic information (age, major orientation or occupation, year of study and sex) and 
14 items of identification of the woman’s group5. The second questionnaire was a French 
version of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996, see Dardenne, Delacolette, 
Grégoire, & Lecoq, 2006, for a French validation). The ASI is a 22-items scale composed of 
two 11-item subscales. One subscale will measure hostile sexism and the other will measure 
benevolent sexism, which is divided into three subcomponents: Protective Paternalism (PP), 
Complementary Gender Differentiation (CGD) and Heterosexual Intimacy (HI). The 
Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales were .86 for the 11 HS items and .90 for the 11 BS items. 
These alphas are in line with those found in Glick and Fiske (1996).  
A. Context Manipulation  
 Once the two questionnaires were completed, we said that we would install the software 
on the computer. In order to prime participants with either a romantic or an occupational 
context, we feigned to be a little embarrassed about the installation of the software. Our 
explanation was that we had some questions to ask before doing anything stupid that could 
                                                             
4 This was interesting to ask because the kind of proposal made by the participants could have an impact on the 
further behaviour in the Ultimatum Game (Bethwaite & Tompkinson, 1996; Forsythe et al., 1994; Nowak et al., 
2000; Solnick, 2001; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). 
5 We did not use this information in the results, so we will not talk about it in details. 
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erase the data because of a wrong manipulation of the software. So we proposed to the 
participant that in the meantime she could pre-test some pictures which were totally 
independent from the study. We said we wanted to do that at the end of the experiment but 
that now was a great time to do so, so we wouldn’t waste any time later on. All the 
participants accepted to do the pre-test while we went out of the lab for an alleged 
question.  
The participants were to describe in two words either occupational pictures or romantic 
pictures. This false pre-test was built to put participants either in the occupational context or 
in the romantic one. This was important to test our hypothesis about unfair offers being less 
accepted in a romantic context than in an occupational one. Each of the alleged pre-tests 
was composed of seven pictures which were tested beforehand. We chose seven pictures 
which turned out to have the highest evaluation in each context, that is, the seven pictures 
which were the most representative of an occupational context and the seven which were 
the most representative of a romantic context. 
B. Ultimatum Game  
After some time, which varied according to the experiments, we re-entered the room and 
waited for the participant to finish the pre-test. We then installed the Ultimatum Game and 
told the participant all the instructions for the game were written on the screen but if she 
had any question, we would give her all the information she needed. We also told her she 
might be presented only with female photographs or only male photographs, due to the 
important amount of pictures we collected, especially from past experiments. We told her 
that was in part due to the random order programmed in the software. We also said that we 
told her this, because we did not want her to be surprised to see only male photographs. We 
stressed this point because we wanted to keep some consistency throughout the 
experiment. We were supposed to have asked all kinds of people, both male and female, to 
have their picture taken, so we needed to make sure they would not wonder “why did the 
experimenter take my picture whereas only men are pictured in the game?”   
The ultimatum game is a game in which player 1 offers a way to share money with player 2. 
Player 2 can either accept or refuse the deal offered by player 1. If player 2 accepts, both 
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players will receive the money according to the kind of split. If player 2 refuses player 1’s 
offer, then both will not receive any money. In our experiment, player 1 was in fact the 
computer. Thus, the offer presented to the participants did not come from other players. 
We made up 39 different offers and included them in the software.  
The Ultimatum Game we used in our experiment was built (using Inquisit software) 
according to the one used in the Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, Lieberman and Robbins’ study 
(2008). Our offers6 fell into three fairness categories: 13 were from 40% to 50% of stake 
(fair), 13 from 27% to 33% of stake (unfair) and 13 from 18% to 22% of stake (most unfair) as 
in the study by Crockett et al. (2008).  
We used 39 pre-tested pictures of males. They were pre-tested on either benevolent or 
hostile facial cues. For each picture, the participants were asked to complete the French 
version of the ASI (Dardenne, Delacollette, Grégoire, & Lecoq, 2006), and asked to say to 
what extent they found the pictured man attractive, chivalrous, domineering and to what 
extent the pictured man would attract their attention if they encountered him in a public 
place.  
The game began with some instruction pages, and then a trial game was presented to help 
participants understand exactly how to use the keyboard. The participants were presented 
with a screen showing the following sentence: “Player A received € 15 and decided to split 
them as follows: X for you and X for him. Do you accept his offer?” No pictures were 
presented here. They could respond by pressing 1 to accept or 2 to refuse. The trial game 
was composed of 5 instances of offers. These offers were not the same as those used in the 
real game. They received proposers’ offers were a division of € 15 (see Appendix). The stakes 
were € 7, 6, 5, 3, 2 out of 15, presented randomly across the subjects. After each 
participant’s decision, a screen would appear with the amount of money they received for 
2000ms (“You received X euros” if they pushed 1 and “You both received 0 euros” if they 
pushed 2).  
Once the trial game was over, participants were given the instructions one more time before 
beginning the Ultimatum Game. In each session, the participants played 39 games. First, one 
of the 39 pre-tested pictures appeared and stayed on the screen for 3000ms. Then, on the 
                                                             
6 All the materials (offers, pictures, pre-test questionnaires, etc.) are available in the Appendix. 
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next screen, the participants faced the very same pictures with the amount of the stake and 
the amount of the offer (see Appendix). In addition to the screen with the amount of money 
received after each of their decisions (as in the trial games), the participants were to press 
ENTER to go on to the next picture, so they could take their time between the pictures 
without interfering with the delay in reacting. All 39 offers and 39 pictures were randomly 
presented, only once per experiment. Throughout the experiments, there was a possibility 
for any given picture to be presented with the same offer more than once.  We could not 
control it because of the random order programmed in the software. Only for two 
participants was picture number 1 presented twice with a different offer. We chose to keep 
only the offer and the reaction time which appeared first in the game in the data file.  
At the end of the experiment, the participants were debriefed and thanked7.    
  
                                                             
7 The participants were asked to fill in a third questionnaire after playing the Ultimatum Game. This 
questionnaire was composed of items from diverse scales. 6 items came from the SDO scale (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), 7 from the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967) and 13 from the Propensity to 
Trust Survey or PTS (Evans & Revelle, 2008). The data from this third questionnaire were not used in the 




II. RESULTS  
The data of two participants were not taken into account in the analyses as their data were 
unusable because of their strangeness (thus, n=23 in romantic context and n=25 in 
occupational context). Two decisions were missing in the remaining data, as explained in the 
above Ultimatum Game section. We therefore based our analysis on 1870 decisions 
((39x48)-2).  
Because the goal of our experiment was to know how long the participants would take to 
make a decision, either to accept or reject a proposed offer, removing outliers (reaction 
times which are too long or too short) could eliminate the reaction times that are 
responsible for the effect we could or wanted to find (Ratcliff, 1993). Because we did not 
build a task in which participants had to be as fast as possible, we do not consider long 
reaction times as outliers and we will keep them in our analyses.  
1. Manipulation Check 
At the end of the experiment, we asked the participants to evaluate on a 7-point scale 
(1/romantic context to 7/occupational context) to what extent the photographs presented in 
the alleged pre-test made them think about a romantic or occupational context. The 
univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that the context was correctly primed, F(1, 
46) = 485, p<.001, η² = .91. The participants reported that the photographs made them think 
about the romantic context when they were primed with romantic-related pictures (M = 
1.43, SD = 1.1), and that the photographs made them think about the occupational context 




2. Reaction Times 
We used a 2(context: romantic vs occupational) × 3(offer: fair vs unfair vs very unfair) one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with reaction time as dependent variable, variable of 
context is in between-subject and variable of offer is in within-subject. Here we found a 
global effect of the kind of offer, F(2, 1864) = 18.96, p < .001, η² = .02. It took more time for 
the participants to make a decision (rejection or acceptation) when facing an unfair offer (M 
= 4917, SD = 3707) than when facing a fair offer (M = 4171, SD = 3097) or a very unfair offer 
(M = 3804, SD = 2803). Post hoc analysis for the kind of offer showed that the reaction times 
in unfair offers condition significantly differed from those in fair offers condition, with p < 
.001 and in very unfair offers condition, with p < .001. The reaction times in fair offers 
condition significantly differed from the reaction times in very unfair offers condition, with p 
< .05. However we did not find any significant global context effect, F(1, 1864) = 1.49, p = .2, 
ns, η² = .001. Participants took the same time to make a decision (rejection or acceptation) in 
a romantic context (M = 4202, SD = 3132) than in an occupational context (M = 4384, SD = 
3364). The interaction between context and offer variables was not significant, F(2, 1864) = 
.76, p = .47, ns,  η² = .001. 
 
Table 1 
Reaction Times according to Context and Type of Offer  
  Type of Offer  Total 
Context Fair Unfair Very Unfair  
Romantic 4178 4694 3734 4202 
Occupational 4164 5122 3869 4384 
     
Total 4171 4917 3804  
 
 
When we take a look at Table 2, we can see that, as predicted, in the condition of unfair 
offers (ambiguous situation), there was no significant difference between reaction times for 





participants took the same time to reject (M = 4837, SD = 3257) than to accept (M = 5014, SD 
= 4193) an offer. In the fair condition, there was a significant difference between the 
reaction times for rejection and acceptation, t(624) = 6.18, p<.001. The participants were 
quicker to accept an offer (M = 3892, SD = 2672) than to reject it (M = 6155, SD = 4778). In 
the very unfair condition, the difference between the reaction times for rejection and 
acceptation was almost significant, t(620) = -1.61, p=.1, ns. Participants tended to be quicker 
to reject an offer (M = 3765, SD = 2805) than to accept it (M = 4639, SD = 2681). 
 
Table 2 
Participants’ Reaction Times Means to Accept or Reject Offers  
  Type of Offer  
Decision Fair Unfair Very Unfair 
Acceptation 3892 (n=549) 5014(n=281) 4639(n=28) 
Rejection 6155 (n=77) 4837(n=341) 3765(n=594) 
 
 
We can note that the n are only comparable in the unfair condition (n=281 and n=341). In 
the fair condition, almost every participant accepted offers and in the very unfair condition, 
almost everyone rejected offers. 
 
To test our fourth hypothesis, we performed stepwise linear regressions entering reaction 




A. Romantic Context  
As a first step, we entered facial attractiveness, the data from the faces’ on BS subscales (PP, 
IH, CGD) and the participants’ data on the BS subscales (PP, IH, CGD). As a second step, we 
wanted to look at the interaction between the data from the faces’ and the participants’ 
data. 
a. Rejection 
The regression revealed a significant effect of the participants’ level on the IH subscale in the 
ASI, β = -.21, t(23) = -1.9,  p=.05. The higher the participant scored on the IH subscale, the 
less time they took to reject the unfair offers. Thus, the faster they rejected unfair offers. 
Contrary to our prediction, no significant effect of the level of faces’ characteristics on the 
subscale of IH in the ASI was found, β = -.07, t(23) = -.43,  p=.66, ns. No other significant 
effect was found either.  
The second step of our regression analysis did not show anything significant. Adding the 
interactions changed the model’s significativity. R square in the first step was .08, with F = 
1.99, p = .06. When we added the interactions, R square became .01, with F = .70, p = .55. 
Because adding interactions did not improve the model, we thus decided to stay in the first 
step and not go any further.   
b. Acceptation   
The regression showed a significant effect of the participants’ level on the PP subscale in the 
ASI, β = -.29, t(23) = -2.23,  p=.03. The higher the participants scored on the PP subscale, the 
less time they took to accept unfair offers, that is, the faster they accepted unfair offers. The 
analyses also revealed a tendency in the analysis of level on the CGD subscale in the ASI, β = 
-.17, t(23) = -1.58,  p=.11, ns. The higher the participant scored on the CGD subscale, the less 
they tended to take time to accept an unfair offer, that is, they tended to be faster to accept 
the offer. These non predicted results will be discussed later on, in the discussion section. 
However, we did not find any significant effect for the participants’ level on the IH subscale 
in the ASI, β = .10, t(23) = .74,  p=.46, ns.  
The second step of our regression analysis did not show anything significant. Adding the 
interactions changed the model’s significativity. R square in the first step was .13, with F = 
2.39, p = .03. When we added the interactions, R square became .05, with F = 2.01., p = .12.  
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Because adding interactions did not improve the model, we thus decided to stay in the first 
step and not go any further.   
B. Occupational Context  
We performed an analysis which was similar to the romantic context to test our fourth 
hypothesis, using the same variables (subjects’ data, faces’ pre-test on BS subscales data and 
facial attractiveness). As a first step, we entered the facial attractiveness, the data from the 
faces’ on the BS subscales (PP, IH, CGD) and the participants’ data on the BS subscales (PP, 
IH, CGD). As a second step, we wanted to look at the interaction between the data from the 
faces’ and the participants’ data. 
a. Rejection    
The regression revealed a marginally significant effect of the participants’ level on the CGD 
subscale in the ASI, β = -.32, t(25) = -1.86,  p=.06. The higher the participant scored on the 
CGD subscale, the less time they took to reject the unfair offers. Thus, the faster they 
rejected unfair offers. We found no significant effect of the participants’ level on the PP 
subscale in the ASI, β = .18, t(25) = .88,  p=.38, ns. Our hypothesis is thus not confirmed.  
Although the effect is not significant, we can see that it suggests that the higher the 
participant scored on the PP subscale, the more time they tended to take to reject the unfair 
offers. No other significant effect was found.  
The second step of our regression analysis did not show anything significant. Adding the 
interactions changed the model’s significativity. R square in the first step was .04, with F = 
.91, p = .5. When we added the interactions, R square became .01, with F = .31, p = .82.  
Because adding interactions did not improve the model, we thus decided to stay in the first 
step and not go any further.   
b. Acceptation    
The regression showed a significant effect of the participants’ level on the IH subscale in the 
ASI, β = -.24, t(25) = 2.52,  p=.01 as well as a significant effect of the participants’ level on the 
CGD subscale in the ASI, β = -.25, t(25) = -2.49,  p=.01. The higher the participants scored on 
the IH and CGD subscales, the less time they took to accept unfair offers, that is, the faster 
they accepted unfair offers.  
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The second step of our regression analysis did not show anything significant. Adding the 
interactions changed the model’s significativity. R square in the first step was .09, with F = 
2.06, p = .05. When we added the interactions, R square became .02, with F = .97, p = .41. 
Because adding interactions did not improve the model, we thus decided to stay in the first 
step and not go any further.   
3. Rejection/ Acceptation 
We performed a 2(context: romantic vs. occupational) × 3(offer: fair vs. unfair vs. very 
unfair) ANOVA with acceptation/rejection as dependent variable and context (between-
subjects) as well as kind of offer (within-subjects) as independent variables. As expected, the 
context had a significant effect, F(1, 1864) = 4.8, p<.05, η² = .003, as well as the kind of offer, 
F(2, 1864) = 813.4, p<.001, η² = .46 , on decision-making. The Context × Kind of offer 
interaction had a significant effect, F(2, 1864) = 2.9, p=.05, η² = .003.  
The post hoc analyses showed that the kinds of offer significantly differ from one another. 
Fair offers (M = .88, SD = .33) significantly differ from unfair offers (M = .45, SD = .49), with 
p<.001, and from very unfair offers (M = .05, SD = .21), with p<.001. Unfair offers 
significantly differ from very unfair offers, with p<.001. We also learn that there is less 
acceptation in the romantic context (M = .44, SD = .49) than in the occupational context (M = 
.48, SD = .50). There is no significant difference between the romantic and occupational 
contexts in the fair condition, F(1, 624) = .29, p=.59, ns, as well as in the very unfair 
condition, F(1, 620) = .026, p=.87, ns. In line with our expectations, the effect of context is 
present only in the unfair offers condition, F(1, 620) = 5.6, p=.02. We also predicted that only 
in the unfair condition would a difference appear between acceptation and rejection of 
offers. Thus, we can see in Table 3 that there is less acceptation in the romantic context (M = 
.4, SD = .5) than in the occupational context (M = .5, SD = .5). The unfair condition is thus the 






Level of Acceptation of Offer according to Type of Offer and Context 
  Type of offer  Total 
Context Fair Unfair Very unfair  
Romantic .87 .40 .04 .44 
Occupational .88 .50 .05 .48 
     
Total .88 .45 .05  
 
 
We also performed a logistic regression in the unfair offer condition because it is a more 
appropriate analysis than ANOVA. We will report the parameter estimate b and its Standard 
Error (SE) for both romantic and occupational contexts. b is an estimator of the change in the 
logit caused by a unit change in the independent variable. A value of 0 indicates that the 
variable does not influence the independent variable. The Wald statistic and its 
corresponding p are commonly used to test the significance of b. The Odds Ratio (OR) is the 
natural log of b; an OR of 1 indicates that the independent variable has no effect. 
Consequently, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) does not contain the value of one. 
We wanted to know whether there was a significant difference between the contexts in the 
unfair offer cells. The analysis revealed that there is a significant effect of the context in the 
unfair offer condition (b = .39, SE = .16, Wald = 5.61, p =.02; OR = 95% CI [1.07, 2.028]), while 
controlling for attractiveness. The acceptation rate in the romantic context is significantly 
different from the one in the occupational context. A significant effect of attractiveness is 
also found (b = .12, SE = .04, Wald = 8.58, p = .003; OR 95% CI [1.04, 1.213]) only in the unfair 
offers condition. The more attractive the faces are, the greater the acceptation of unfair 
offers. 
 
II II ^ 
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To know exactly what could explain this effect in the unfair cells, we tested our fourth and 
fifth hypotheses. We performed a stepwise logistic regression entering acceptation/rejection 
as a dependent variable. 
A. Romantic Context 
As a first step, we entered the facial attractiveness, the data from the faces’ on the BS 
subscales (PP, IH, CGD) and the participants’ data on the BS subscales (PP, IH, CGD). The 
regression revealed a significant effect of attractiveness (b = .16, SE = .06, Wald = 5.82, 
p=.02, OR = 95% CI [1.03, 1.33]). So, the higher the level of attractiveness of the face, the 
greater the acceptation of unfair offers by the participants. An effect of the participants’ 
level on the IH subscale in the ASI (b = -.68, SE = .06, Wald = 5.82, p<.001; OR = 95% CI [.36, 
.72]) as well as an effect on the CGD subscale in the ASI (b = .48, SE = .15, Wald = 9.75, 
p=.002; OR = 95% CI [1.19, 2.17])  were found, but not for the PP subscale in the ASI (b = .14, 
SE = .19, Wald = .61, p = .4; OR = 95% CI [.80, 1.66]). The higher the participants scored on 
the IH subscale, the more they rejected unfair offers. Conversely, the higher the participants 
scored on the CGD subscale, the more they accepted unfair offers. Contrary to our 
prediction, no significant effect of the level of faces’ characteristics on the IH subscale in the 
ASI was found (b = -.11, SE = .29, Wald = .15, p=.7; OR = 95% CI [.51, 1.58]). 
As a second step, we wanted to look at the interaction between the data from the faces’ 
pre-test and the participants’ data. The interaction between the score of the subject on the 
IH subscale and the level of faces’ characteristics on the IH subscale was not significant (b = 
.21, SE = .17, Wald = 1.61, p=.2; OR = 95% CI [.89, 1.72]). The interaction between the score 
of the subject on the CGD subscale and the level of faces’ characteristics on the CGD 
subscale was not significant either (b = .06, SE = .18, Wald = .10, p=.7; OR = 95% CI [.74, 
1.51]). The final interaction, between the score of the subject on the PP subscale and the 
level of faces’ characteristics on the PP subscale, was not significant either (b = -.34, SE = .24, 
Wald = 2.09, p=.1; OR = 95% CI [.44, 1.13]). Since the analyses revealed no significant effect 
for any of the interactions, we will stick to the first step and will not go any further. 
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B. Occupational Context  
We performed an analysis which was similar to the romantic context, using the same 
variables (subjects’ data, faces’ on BS subscales data and faces’ attractiveness). The 
regression analysis found a significant effect for the participants’ score on PP subscale in the 
ASI (b = .47, SE = .23, Wald = 4.12, p=.04; OR = 95% CI [1.02, 2.51]), but not in the predicted 
direction. In fact, we expected that the higher participants scored on the PP subscale, the 
more they would reject the offers. The analysis revealed instead that the higher participants 
scored on the PP subscale, the more they accepted the offers. The analysis however did not 
reveal a significant effect either for the participants’ score on the IH subscale in the ASI (b = 
.15, SE = .16, Wald = .87, p=.3; OR = 95% CI [.85, 1.58]), or for the participants’ score on the 
CGD subscale in the ASI (b = -.29, SE = .17, Wald = 2.77, p=.09; OR = 95% CI [.53, 1.05]). No 
effect of facial attractiveness was found in the occupational context (b = .05, SE = .06, Wald = 
.7, p=.4; OR = 95% CI [.93, 1.18]) 
As in the romantic context, we proceeded with a second step in the logistic regression. We 
also wanted to look at the interaction between the data from the faces’ pre-test and the 
participants’ data. The interaction between the score of the subject on the IH subscale and 
the level of faces’ characteristics on the IH subscale was not significant (b = .05, SE = .15, 
Wald = .13, p=.7; OR = 95% CI [.79, 1.42]). The interaction between the score of the subject 
on the CGD subscale and the level of faces’ characteristics on the CGD subscale was not 
significant either (b = -.14, SE = .20, Wald = .50, p=.4; OR = 95% CI [.59, 1.28]). The final 
interaction, between the score of the subject on the PP subscale and the level of faces’ 
characteristics on the PP subscale, was not significant either (b = .15, SE = .29, Wald = .27, 
p=.6; OR = 95% CI [.66, 2.05]). Since the analyses revealed no significant effect for any of the 






III. DISCUSSION  
 
Benevolent sexism does have a non negligible impact on the players’ behaviour during an 
Ultimatum Game, but the effects are not similar according to the context the participants 
are immersed in whether in relation to the level of BS that participants possess or the extent 
to which male faces possess faces’ characteristics associated with BS. Moreover, 
attractiveness also does impact the way participants are playing and making a decision. But 
how do these elements exactly impact the way people act in an Ultimatum Game?   
The main objective underlying this report was to investigate the influences that come into 
play in an Ultimatum Game. Does context matter? Can BS levels have consequences on the 
players’ behaviour? Will attractiveness be determining in the players’ choices when it comes 
to choosing between accepting or refusing an offer? And what can be said about the type of 
offer?  Would unfair, very unfair and fair offers have the same rates of 
rejection/acceptation?    
The literature we have reviewed in the previous sections helped us formulate several 
hypotheses concerning the different impacts that could be observed in an UG condition and 
their exact implications on the players’ behaviour.          
In this section, we will discuss the results that emerged from the experiment we have 
conducted. We will first review the hypotheses that have been confirmed. Then we will 
present the results we did not expect but which surfaced from our experiment. In a third 
section, we will consider the limitations of our study and what could be done in future 
research to go further in the field we have tackled in this dissertation.   





1. Hypotheses Confirmed by the Results 
Our first hypothesis predicted that facing unfair offers, the participants would take more 
time to make a decision, whether to accept or reject a proposed offer. As we have seen in 
the results section, reaction times were significantly longer in making a decision when the 
participants were facing an unfair offer as compared to fair and very unfair offers. As already 
hinted at, unfair offers, because it is difficult to really determine whether they are fair or 
very unfair (the first half being near the lowest fair offers and the second part being close to 
the higher very unfair ones) could be considered as ambiguous and then lead to more 
difficult decision making, which thus resulted in longer reaction times. One possible 
explanation would be that they were astonished by the offers and then took more time to 
make a decision as to whether accept or reject an unfair offer. 
Our second hypothesis concerned the effect of attractiveness of the pictured faces on the 
acceptation rates of offers. Evidences for the confirmation of the hypothesis were partially 
found. We expected a global effect of attractiveness, whatever the context. A global effect 
was found, but further analyses revealed that the effect of attractiveness was present only in 
the romantic context. The participants accepted significantly more unfair offers when they 
stemmed from an attractive rather than unattractive man in a romantic context.   
Our third hypothesis introduced the difference that could be observed depending on 
whether players were in a romantic or an occupational context. Participants accepted unfair 
offers significantly more often in a romantic context than in an occupational one. We believe 
that because women expected to receive a “financial support” from men in a romantic 
context, the fact that their expectations were not met could upset them and hence lead 
them to refuse the proposed offers. In an occupational context, the participants rejected the 
offers half of the time, which does not differ from chance. We suggest that there was a 
contrast effect. They expected something and yet, they did not receive it.  
Our fourth hypothesis focused on what happened in the romantic context. The first two sub-
hypotheses, concerning the score of the participants on the IH subscale in the ASI were 
confirmed. The first one had to do with the rejection rates of unfair offers. We have found 
that the higher participants scored on the IH subscale, the more they rejected unfair offers. 
Because of their great need for intimacy and because of their expectations regarding help, 
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care and financial assistance that are linked with the behaviour men are supposed to express 
in a romantic environment were not fulfilled, the female participants were not satisfied with 
the amount proposed by the men on the pictures and then decided to reject this inadequate 
offer. This frustration was also confirmed by the results associated with our second sub-
hypothesis showing that the higher the level of participants on the IH subscale, the shorter 
their reaction times in rejecting an unfair offer.  This effect of rejecting unfair offers in a 
romantic context could be associated with the punishment of unfair behaviour found in 
Bolton and Zwick’s results (1995). Because men did not do what they were expected to do, 
women, accordingly, punished them for their inappropriate behaviour.  
The last two sub-hypotheses of the fourth hypothesis, dealing with the level of faces’ BS 
characteristics and the interaction between the BS level for the participants and for the 
faces, and the two sub-hypotheses of the fifth hypothesis, dealing with the rejection rate 
and reaction times in rejecting offers in the occupational context, were not confirmed by the 
results. 
2. Unexpected but Interesting Results 
A. For Protective Paternalism (PP) 
a. Occupational Context 
As already hinted at in the previous section, results did not produce any evidence confirming 
our fourth hypothesis. However, the results showed a significant effect in the opposite 
direction of hypothesis 4a: the higher the participants scored on the PP subscale of the ASI, 
the more they accepted unfair offers in an occupational context. This is a surprising result 
because we believed that women would want to be treated equally with men at work and 
not to be under the financial care of men in this situation. However, we observed the 
opposite effect. Based on the results from Sarlet and Dardenne (study 3, in preparation), 
stating that women report more prescription of PP in an occupational context when they are 
high in need of PP, this result may be explained. The more women are in need of PP, the 
more they would accept financial help from their male colleagues. Even if women prescribe 
more PP in a romantic context than in a professional one (Sarlet & Dardenne, study 1, in 
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preparation), the participants’ level of PP would have an impact and lead female participants 
to accept unfair offers. Maybe it would be interesting to look at the behaviour of low-PP 
participants to see if the opposite can be found, too. If women are low in PP, would they 
reject unfair offers more often than women who are high in PP?  
Hypothesis 4b is not confirmed either, but results showed a tendency in the opposite 
direction, too: the higher the participants scored on the PP subscale, the more they tended 
to take time to reject unfair offers. This opposite tendency could be explained by the fact 
that they did not expect any financial help in an occupational context, as opposed to the 
expectation of help in the romantic context. Therefore, they tended to take more time to 
reject offers because they did not want to punish the men for being out of their supposed 
role as protector which makes sense in a romantic context. Maybe with a larger sample we 
could find a more precise effect.  
b. Romantic Context 
In the romantic context, the higher the participants scored on the PP, the less time they took 
to accept the offers. This effect was not predicted, but the fact that it appeared is not really 
a surprise. Indeed, even if they did not say anything about the effect of the women’s level on 
the three subscales of BS, Moya et al. (2007) found that high-BS women are likely to accept 
protective restrictions from their romantic partner. Viki et al. (2003) showed that people 
who are high in BS are more likely to accept paternalistic chivalry, holding that men need a 
woman in their live to be complete but they also have to protect and take care of them. Our 
participants’ need for protective paternalism can thus explain the likeliness of them 
accepting unfair offers in a romantic context. Moreover, because men normally protect and 
look after their romantic partners, it makes sense that women accept their financial help, 




B. For Complemen tary Gender Differentiation (CGD) 
a. Occupational Context 
An almost significant effect was found for the participants’ level of CGD in the occupational 
context. The higher the participants scored on the CGD subscale, the less they tended to 
take time to reject unfair offers. Surprisingly, the higher they scored in CGD, the less they 
took time to accept an offer. It seems that, whatever their response, they were quick to 
make a decision. 
b. Romantic Context 
The higher the participants scored on the CGD subscale, the more they accepted unfair 
offers. We could explain this by the fact that women high in CGD express dependence on 
men, in order to reproduce themselves, and because they were in a romantic context, they 
tended to do what they were supposed to do to find a potential partner. Even if the men 
they faced were not real persons, the idea of looking for a partner may be activated and the 
women could act accordingly.  In the same, even if not significant, vein, results revealed a 
tendency going into the direction that the higher the level of CGD in participants, the less 
they are likely to take time to accept an unfair offer. Maybe this effect would be greater if 
we had a larger sample, with more subjects for every condition. 
C. For Intimate Heterosexuality (IH) 
In the occupational context, the higher the participants scored in the IH subscales, the less 
time they took to accept unfair offers. One might have expected, as shown in Sarlet and 
Dardenne (in preparation), women in an occupational context to want more equality with 
men and then to act accordingly, that is, to refuse any help from a man in a work context. 
Besides, as Moya et al. (2007) have demonstrated, women do not accept protective 
justification to a restriction coming from a colleague. It was also demonstrated that BS is 
better accepted when it comes from a romantic partner rather than from a colleague. Thus, 
the fact that women who scored high in the IH subscale accepted unfair offers faster is quite 
surprising. Maybe this could be explained by the fact that women expressing a high need for 
intimacy would be engaged, maybe not entirely consciously, in the search of a partner in 
order to find the intimacy they are looking for. Because the occupational context was not a 
real one, but just a condition the participants were immersed in, and because the money 
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was not real and not proposed by a real person, elements which would activate the need of 
equality in the work place and allow the participants to act accordingly were not present in 
our experiment. In addition, because our participants were University students, they only 
possessed an a priori about the professional world and all the elements associated with it 
are not echoed in their minds. 
D. For Face Attractiveness 
The hypothesis about attractiveness was only partially confirmed. In effect, as introduced 
before, women accepted more unfair offers coming from attractive rather than unattractive 
men only in the romantic context. This result is, to a degree, in line with those Solnick and 
Schweitzer (1999) found. Female participants rejected unfair offers less often when they 
stemmed from attractive men rather than from unattractive ones. The fact that this effect 
only appeared in the romantic context could be explained by the fact that a romantic 
context activates the idea of searching for a partner. We hypothesised that women would 
refuse unfair offers more often in a romantic context because their expectancies had not 
been met. Maybe the attractiveness of their partner would surpass the frustration they first 
felt and then lead them to accept offers from an attractive potential partner. Moya et al. 
(2007) showed that protective restrictions were accepted by women when they came from a 
romantic partner. Viki et al. (2003) found that people could accept a system in which women 
are treated with courteousness and kindness, but in which they have restricted roles in an 
intimate relationship. Maybe attractiveness activates all these beliefs concerning the men 
and women’s role in a romantic situation and thus it leads women to enter that role and 
accept financial help from a man who is supposed to help them in this particular context.     
3. Conclusion 
It seems that, globally, women who are high in CGD in a romantic context and high in PP in 
an occupational one accept unfair offers that come from men. Reaction times are also 
significantly shorter when it comes to accepting unfair offers coming from men when 
women are high in PP in a romantic context and high in IH in an occupational context. We 
could connect these results with those found in Solnick (2001) and Solnick and Schweitzer 
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(1999) that asserted that women never reject offers coming from men, even if in our 
experiment, very unfair offers were highly rejected. In a same vein, as Eckel and Grossman 
(2001) demonstrated, women are more likely than men to accept proposed offers and thus 
their tendency to accept unfair offers, in certain conditions (context and participants’ BS 
subscales scores) may be due to this fact. Maybe the results could be explained by the 
greater cooperation of women in social exchange and economic games, but only when 
facing male partners (Solnick, 2001; Kahn et al., 1971). Another explanation could be that 
women are more averse to risk than men (Eckel & Grossman, 2002), thus they would accept 
more unfair offers because it is more cautious to do that than risking not having anything. 
Nevertheless, like Eckel and Grossman (2002), we do not think that the aversion of loss plays 
a role in the way women behave. If loss aversion was an element of choice, a weak rejection 
rate should have appeared for all the offers, and this was not what happened. As in most 
studies about the UG (see Güth, 1995 for a review), the participants did not accept offers 
that were below 20% of the total amount. They thus were not led by fear of losing money. 
Our results also showed that the context the participants were in mattered a great deal in 
the way they acted in an Ultimatum Game. In effect, we saw that according to the fact they 
were primed with a romantic or an occupational context, the results were quite different. 
Unlike Moya et al. (2007) and Sarlet and Dardenne (in preparation) have reported, the 
romantic context led to significantly less acceptation of unfair offers than the occupational 
one. However, when we took into account the effects of the three subscales of BS 
separately, we saw that according to the level of PP and CGD in participants, the acceptation 
rate of unfair offers changed. In effect, when participants were high on these two subscales 
of BS, the acceptation of unfair offers varied with them, namely more offers were accepted, 
and they were accepted faster.        
We also found an effect of the pictured male faces’ attractiveness. The more attractive they 
were, the greater the acceptation rate. This is in line with the results of Solnick and 
Schweitzer (1999), revealing that the rejection rate for offers coming from attractive men 
were weaker than those coming from unattractive men. Thus, we can conclude that physical 
attractiveness of male players plays an important part when women players have to decide 
whether to accept or reject the offers generated by those men.  
74 
 
4.  Limitations of our Research and Suggestions for Subsequent 
Experiments 
First of all, it is important to tackle the abnormal size of the n. We had no other choice but to 
decide to take into account not the number of participants but the number of decisions 
made, thus 39 offers for 48 participants. The results should consequently be handled 
carefully. The design we had did not allow us to use better statistics. The design was not 
conducive to other statistics because we took into account both the subjects and faces’ data 
and these variables did not vary, they were static. In the first place, we wanted to use the 
same design as in Blair et al. (2004b), but they had only one non-varying variable whereas 
we had two.  
A. Personal Observations 
One limitation in our experiment had to do with the lack of research in studying the impact 
of BS or even sexism in general in an UG or the impact of facial features in an UG. It was thus 
difficult for us to find papers that could have been relevant. However, it has been interesting 
to find links between all the fields we introduced here. There were some studies that 
considered the gender impact in the UG field but not the participants’ level of sexism. As for 
facial features, except for facial attractiveness, we did not find any studies dealing with that 
effect.  
Another limitation concerns our sample. First of all, the number of participants in each of the 
conditions (romantic and occupational) was not sufficient. Ideally, each of the conditions 
should contain at least 30, or even 40, participants in order to have better statistics and 
clearer results. Moreover, our sample was constituted by students (except for one) and they 
also had only a limited knowledge concerning the world of work. 
As already mentioned in the previous section, this lack of knowledge could be a key factor. It 
would thus be interesting to conduct the same study with people who are professionally 
active. We could also imagine conducting the experiment with women facing real men. We 
could go further and do it with real colleagues in a real workplace. This idea might be 
difficult to apply because of all the variables we would have to control (like attractiveness, 
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affinities between colleagues, positive or negative feelings, power and domination from one 
to another, hierarchical positions, possible tensions and vengeances, etc.). Nevertheless, 
doing it with real people, who would be the experimenter’s accomplice, could be interesting 
since playing with an actual person can have an impact on a future relationship with the 
male proposers. For example, if a woman is single, the fact that she accepts or rejects offers 
could be explained by her search for a romantic partner or attractiveness, etc. Reputation 
may also have a role to play in the participants’ behaviour, as in Nowak et al. (2000), where 
participants did not want to accept offers that were too low for fear that they would be 
classified as “good receivers” to whom low offers can be proposed and would always be 
accepted. Hence, making the context more realistic may lead to other behaviours than those 
observed in our experiment. In addition, Sanfey et al. (2003) demonstrated that the 
reactions in an UG significantly differ according to whether the players are facing a real 
partner or a computer partner. The rejection rate was significantly more important when 
offers came from a human partner rather than from a computer.   
Here it is not really a limitation, but just a questioning. At the beginning of the experiment, 
when we explained its unfolding, we gave as an example a fair share of the pie (i.e. “you’re 
going to face a picture below to which a sentence like “this person received € 20 and 
decided to share it as follows: 10 for you and 10 for him” will appear”). Our question is: 
Couldn’t this element of fairness have some sort of impact on the way the participants 
would play from then on? What about the offer they made just after the explanation? 
Maybe that every time we present an equitable share of the pie as an example, this would 
lead participants to play in a fair way subsequently. So, we could imagine an experiment in 
which we would propose either a fair, unfair or very unfair share of the total amount as an 
example, and examine whether it could have an influence on the way players would go on 
playing. It would be interesting to study this both for player 1 (who will propose an offer 
according to the given example) and player 2 (who will accept the kind of offer presented as 
an example). For instance, if the example offer is a fair one, maybe player 1 (allocator) would 
make a fair proposal and player 2 would accept only fair offers. If the example is an unfair 
proposal, maybe player 1 would propose more unfair offers and player 2 would be more 
likely to accept unfair offers than if the share is a fair one. Maybe players would expect more 
unfair offers after an unfair example and then accept them more easily than if offers were 
76 
 
fair. This subject is not linked to our experiment but it could well be interesting for further 
research to know whether players would act according to the reciprocity principle.        
To conclude this paragraph about our personal observations, we want to point out one of 
our key points, namely the fact that the subjects’ data stemming from the subscales of BS in 
the ASI helped us to find effects that would not have appeared if we had only considered the 
BS scale globally. As in Sarlet and Dardenne (in preparation) and in the dissertation of Bodart 
(2008), we did find significant results when we considered the IH, CGD and PP subscales 
separately. Although they come from the same global scale, their consequences were not 
the same and not going into the same direction. For instance, we saw that, in the romantic 
context, the level of the participants on the IH, PP and CGD subscales did not have the same 
impact. The higher they scored on the IH subscale, the more they rejected unfair offers, 
whereas the higher they scored on the CGD subscale, the more they accepted unfair offers. 
Or that, in the occupational context, PP and IH scores had an impact on the acceptation rate 
of unfair offers, but CGD did not. So, it is worth analysing the separate impacts of the three 
BS subscales in a future research. 
B. Participants’ Comments 
The following limitations stem from remarks that participants made at the end of the 
experiment. 
The first one has to do with why would they refuse money that can be won so easily? Our 
proposition is to make the reward real. In the United States or in the United Kingdom, as far 
as we know, participation in an experiment is rewarded by course credits or monetary 
payment. If money, or any other form of reward (as in Murnighan & Saxon, 1998, where 
they used M&M’s), was involved, would the participants’ behaviour be different? Would we 
witness the appearance of an effect as in Eckel and Grossman (2002), in which women took 
less risk facing real payoff? When female participants received real money and could gamble 
it and choose between five different options, with different risk levels, they chose a riskless 
option four times more than men. Thus, with real payment, would women play differently 
and would our results show another kind of behaviour?   
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A second limitation stemming from the participants’ remarks has to do with the impact of 
the trust the men in the pictures could generate on the behaviour of female participants. 
One participant in our experiment emphasised that she decided whether to accept or reject 
an offer according to the trust she perceived in the men’s eyes. As Emery (2000) introduced 
it, “important visual signals arise from the face. The face provides a plethora of social 
information about an individual's gender, age, familiarity, emotional expression and 
potentially their intentions and mental state. The eyes are very important components of 
the face that can provide this information, especially information about emotional and 
mental states.” (p.582) A look is an important channel which gives access to the soul and the 
personality of other people. As Carl Havelange (1998) says, “l’œil de l’homme est l’image de 
son âme“8 (p.82). Moreover, decoding the language of the eyes would have an impact on 
daily social interactions. And visual contact facilitates the understanding of others and the 
attribution of mental states to these others (Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002). 
Eyes have an important impact on interactions and relationships people have with each 
other (Mason, Tatkow, & Macrae, 2005). In addition, it was demonstrated that people judge 
other people as trustworthy and attractive when their visual contact is direct rather than 
indirect (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006; Mason, Tatkow, & Macrae, 2005). For most people, the look 
in the eye influences the evaluation of other people’s personalities (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). 
We think that the pictured men’s look may have an impact on the trust women would place 
in them. Hence, it would be interesting to take this element into account and study its 
impact, because “un regard peut aussi punir, encourager ou établir une domination”9 (p.88, 
Hall, 1971). It would then be interesting to assess the level of trust in the faces with a 
question like “do you trust this man in the picture?” 
A third remark leads us to wonder about the succession of unfair offers. At the beginning, 
offers are accepted, but “enough is enough “. One of our participants pointed this out. As for 
the order effect in the questionnaire, could the effect of presentation offer exist and matter? 
Maybe we should control this impact? According to Perreault (1975) the order of the 
questions may be a positive element which may improve the quality of the research tool, but 
it could also be a negative factor tending to bias the answers.  He also refers to order-effect 
as the position of an item which would influence the respondent’s reaction to this item. 
                                                             
8 The eye of the man is the reflection of his soul (personal translation) 
9 A look can also punish, encourage or establish a domination (personal translation) 
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Several studies showed that order-effect has an important impact on the way participants 
would answer. The fact that one question comes before another one will change the result, 
as in the case of political surveys (Alspach & Bishop, 1991; Bishop, Oldendick, & Tuchfarber, 
1984; Crespi & Morris, 1984). The order of offers might therefore have an impact on the 
acceptation/rejection rates. Several fair offers followed by an unfair offer may lead to a 
rejection of this offer, whereas if this offer has been presented after very unfair offers or 
unfair offers, it might be accepted. We could choose the order of presentation manually but 
it would be a time-consuming task. And with 39 offers, the balance of the order of 
presentation may lead to infinite possibilities. Moreover, we wanted to present the offers 
randomly in the first place. And randomisation is a way proposed by Perreault (1975) to fight 
the order-effect, so maybe we do not have to change anything about the presentation of the 
offers.   
Finally, we can envision the impact of the participants’ socioeconomic status. Górniak (1999) 
emphasised it, the attitudes to money may be influenced by the socioeconomic status and 
age of the participants. So, according to the way money is considered, the 
acceptation/rejection rates could change. If participants are, for instance, richer than others, 
would they refuse offers below the 50% share of the pie more often? And would participants 
who originate from a less favoured background be likely to accept a greater number of offers 
than those who belong to a more favoured environment? It might be interesting to take this 





At the beginning of our dissertation, we asked ourselves several questions to which our 
experiment partially allowed us to find some answers.  
We conducted an experiment in which we used an Ultimatum Game that we built in order to 
explore the different influences on the behaviour of the different players. We focused on the 
behaviour of the receivers, the computer playing the role of the allocator. We used pre-
tested photographed male faces. We assessed their level of attractiveness as well as their 
level on ASI scale (HS, BS and its three subscales, PP, CGD and IH). We also measured the 
level of the participants on all of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory subscales (HS, BS, IH, CGD, 
and PP) using the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996; see Dardenne, Delacollette, Grégoire, & Lecoq, 
2006, for a French validation). We divided the participants into two context conditions, 
romantic and occupational. We then performed several analyses that permitted us to test 
our different hypotheses. 
As we saw previously, hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4a, and 4b have been confirmed. In effect, our 
results revealed that when facing unfair offers, participants took more time in making a 
decision, whether to accept or reject proposals, than when they faced fair offers or very 
unfair ones. Our first hypothesis was thus confirmed. An effect of attractiveness was found 
in the romantic context even though we expected a global effect, whatever the context. This 
effect partly confirms our second hypothesis. We also learned that the acceptation rate was 
lower in the romantic context, compared to the occupational one, as expressed by our third 
hypothesis. Finally, we found that the participants’ level of IH has an impact both on the 
rejection rate and on the reaction times. We have demonstrated that when participants 
scored high on the IH subscale of the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996), their rejection of unfair offers 
was high and quick.  
Some of our hypotheses did not find any evidence which would have allowed us to confirm 
them. Sure enough, neither the effect of BS facial characteristics possessed by the 
photographed male faces nor the effect of the interaction between the BS data of the 
participants and the BS data of the faces were proved as existing. Our results did not reveal 
any effect of any BS facial characteristics. Even when we took the facial characteristics 
associated with the three subscales of BS separately, those facial cues did not impact any 
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decisions in the Ultimatum Game we built. Quite coherently, we did not find an interaction 
between the BS data of the participants and those of the male faces. 
 Alternatively, some unexpected but really interesting results came out of our analyses. First 
of all, our fifth hypothesis was not confirmed in the expected direction, but an effect in the 
opposite direction was found. In effect, the higher the score of participants on the PP 
subscale, the more often they accepted unfair offers. The second sub-hypothesis of our fifth 
hypothesis was not confirmed either, but, even if not significant, the results suggested an 
opposite effect of the one expected. Other interesting results were found. In the romantic 
context, it was revealed that the participants’ level on the PP and CGD subscales mattered a 
great deal. The higher they scored on the PP subscale, the less they took time to accept 
unfair offers. The higher their level of CGD, the higher their acceptation rate was. In a 
professional context, the participants’ IH and CGD scores influenced the reaction times of 
accepting unfair offers. The higher participants scored on these two subscales, the quicker 
they were to accept unfair offers.  
Finally, some tendencies were found. Even if the tendency in the occupational context was 
closer to reach significance than the one in the romantic context, the participants tended to 
be faster to take a decision when facing unfair offers when they scored high on CGD 
subscale. This element of result has to be handled with caution because these are only 
tendencies and we do not know exactly how to understand them.     
All together, our results brought some responses to our initial interrogations about the 
potential effects on the behaviour players would adopt in an Ultimatum Game.  
 
We can conclude our experiment by saying that the way players would act in an Ultimatum 
Game will depend on the type of offers that are proposed, the context in which the game 
takes place, the participants’ level on the three subscales of the BS scale, and the allocators’ 
attractiveness. 
We can summarise our findings in these terms: 
Offers that are fair and very unfair will be respectively highly accepted and highly rejected, 
whatever the context.  
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Unfair offers will be less accepted in a romantic context than in an occupational one.  
In a romantic context, a high level of IH in receivers would lead them to be faster to reject 
unfair offers, whereas a high level of PP would lead them to be quicker to accept unfair 
offers. The attractiveness of the allocators’ faces as well as a high level on CGD subscale for 
receivers will lead to a greater acceptation of unfair offers.  
In a professional context, scores on the IH and CGD subscales will impact on the time players 
take to accept unfair offers. The higher receivers score on these two subscales, the faster 
they will be to accept unfair offers. The level of PP in players will have repercussions on their 
acceptation rate. The higher the level of PP, the more players will accept unfair offers.  
 
As we asserted in the discussion part of this dissertation, future research is needed to help 
us going further in the interrogations we introduced.  Because it seems that our experiment 
is integrated in quite a new field of research, lots has to be done and several other questions 
could arise. First of all, it would be interesting to be sure of the reproducibility of the results, 
and that, by maybe using a greater sample. Influences that could explain the differences of 
behaviour in economic games as well as in different contexts are important to be analysed in 
order to know and understand them better. Once acknowledged, we could intervene in 
order to reduce negative differences between people in general, and between men and 
women in particular.   
 
Our results could be an additional element that could enrich the knowledge permitting the 
continuation of the struggle against sexism in our society and could help to understand the 
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APPENDIX 6: Offers (Example and Actual Game) 
 
EXAMPLE:  
" Le joueur A a reçu 15 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 7 pour vous et 8 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
" Le joueur A a reçu 15 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 3 pour vous et 12 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
" Le joueur A a reçu 15 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 5 pour vous et 10 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
" Le joueur A a reçu 15 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 2 pour vous et 13 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
" Le joueur A a reçu 15 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 6 pour vous et 9 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
 
ACTUAL GAME : 
Fair Offers 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 10 pour vous et 10 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 9,85 pour vous et 10,15 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 9,70 pour vous et 10,30 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 9,55 pour vous et 10,45 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 9,40 pour vous et 10,60 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
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"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 9,25 pour vous et 10,75 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 9 pour vous et 11 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 8,85 pour vous et 11,15 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 8,70 pour vous et 11,30 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 8,55 pour vous et 11,45 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 8,40 pour vous et 11,60 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 8,25 pour vous et 11,75 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 8 pour vous et 12 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
Unfair Offers 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 7 pour vous et 13 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 6,85 pour vous et 13,15 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 6,70 pour vous et 13,30 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 6,55 pour vous et 13,45 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 6,40 pour vous et 13,60 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
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"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 6,25 pour vous et 13,75 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 6 pour vous et 14 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 5,85 pour vous et 14,15 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 5,70 pour vous et 14,30 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 5,55 pour vous et 14,45 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 5,40 pour vous et 14,60 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 5,25 pour vous et 14,75 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 5 pour vous et 15 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
Very Unfair Offers 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 4 pour vous et 16 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 3,85 pour vous et 16,15 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 3,70 pour vous et 16,30 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 3,55 pour vous et 16,45 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 3,40 pour vous et 16,60 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
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"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 3,25 pour vous et 16,75 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 3 pour vous et 17 pour lui. 
Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 2,85 pour vous et 17,15 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 2,70 pour vous et 17,30 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 2,55 pour vous et 17,45 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 2,40 pour vous et 17,60 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 2,25 pour vous et 17,75 pour 
lui. Acceptez-vous son offre?" 
"Cet homme a reçu 20 euros et il décide de les partager comme suit : 2 pour vous et 18 pour lui. 
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APPENDIX 8: Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 
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